




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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

BEADLE'S AMERICAN BATTLES.

PITTSBURG LANDING,

(SHILOH.)


AND THE

INVESTMENT OF CORINTH.

DRAWN FROM

ORIGINAL SOURCES, OFFICERS' REPORTS, ETC.; WITH
ANECDOTES, INCIDENTS, ETC.

Orville James Victor



BEADLE AND COMPANY,
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INTRODUCTORY.

THE version here given of the Battle of Pittsburg Landing is such as we have been able to compile from the official reports of the division and brigade commanders, from the correspondence of news reporters and from the letters of those engaged on the field during those two most sanguinary and exciting days. These materials were ample for the production of a satisfactory narrative — something which the public demands should be placed within its reach. The news reporters spread far and wide such varied versions of the accidents and incidents of the battles, as to confuse the public mind. This confusion, however, the reports referred to have cleared up; and we are therefore able to present the story as it will doubtless be told in history. The correspondents for the press gave narratives of great interest; from their letters we have culled such material memoranda and incidents as seemed to add to the completeness of the story.

Of the “siege” of Corinth we have written as the data at hand permitted. It will be found less specific *in detail* than the account of the conflicts of April 6th and 7th, owing to the neglect of the commanding officer to publish the official reports submitted by his Generals. The comparatively uninteresting nature of the events which characterized the seven weeks’ “approach” to Corinth renders the absence of these reports a

matter of little moment; the more general narratives of reporters for the press answering every purpose to give a clear idea of the slow *investment* of the rebel stronghold and its shrewdly conceived evacuation—leaving Halleck's tremendous army without an enemy to fight.

O. J. V.

BATTLE OF PITTSBURG LANDING.

FIRST DAY'S CONFLICT.

GATHERING OF THE HOSTS.

AFTER the series of splendid victories which resulted in the occupation of the capital of Tennessee by the Federal forces, Generals Buell and Grant found themselves confronted by a powerful army prepared to dispute their further progress with desperation. The rebel cause would irreparably suffer in event of further defeat in the heart of their Confederacy. Foote might thunder away at the gates of the Mississippi—Porter might send the echoes of his mighty mortars through the lagunes of Louisiana—Pope might plot his way down to Memphis; but all these had less terror for the secession leaders than Buell's and Grant's advancing hosts, placed in the hand of Halleck to maneuver with his superior strategy. To stay their onward march would be to check the entire campaign in the Mississippi valley; and, if victory should crown the Southern arms, the tide of defeat might not only be stayed, but Nashville and Donelson might be regained; Island No. 10 might be held, and the Unionists forced back into Kentucky in a disorganized condition. This was surely a work of magnitude, and would require not only the men but the officers equal to a desperate emergency.

General A. Sidney Johnston was detached from the army of the Potomac to command this central campaign. Beauregard was made second in command. Manassas and Centreville were evacuated, and the lines drawn more closely around the capital of Virginia in order to allow a heavy detachment to follow on after the two leaders. Bragg was recalled from Pensacola, where so long he had watched and plotted for victory but found it not; and with him came the flower of

his host—a well-drilled, thoroughly-ordered division of artillery and infantry. The shattered divisions of Pillow and Floyd were available. Bishop Polk's Columbus column was in good order, and reported to be "eager for the fray." Hardee, Cheaham, Hindman, all were given brigades. The remnant of General Sterling Price's Missouri army was brought into requisition, and Governor Jackson's auxiliary corps was recalled from its inglorious career west of the Mississippi to add to the imposing array. General Breckenridge, with his "gallant army," was also requested to take the field and try to earn a name. All these elements combined to form the heart of the new army; while, to swell its numbers, the most extraordinary efforts were made by the State and Confederate authorities, even to impressing where drafting failed to force men into the ranks. Six weeks served to concentrate and render effective this newly-created host, and the Federal leaders became aware that at Corinth the great struggle must be made which would make or break the Southern cause in the West.*

The several divisions of Buell's army began to move forward from Nashville and its western line of occupation late in March. The design was a combination of the two armies—to make a junction with Grant's forces on the west bank of the Tennessee, taking up a line of advance between Savannah and Purdy. This junction it was the aim of rebel strategy to prevent. It called Johnston and Beauregard out of their strong position on the hills of Corinth to make the desperate onslaught at Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing—an assault which came nearer to a victory for their arms than we care to contemplate.

The occupation of Savannah, by General Grant, was made about the middle of March, and his advance (left wing, Sher-

* To show what importance Johnston attached to the impending battle, we may quote from his address to his army, dated April 3d:

"SOLDIERS: I have put you in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your country, with the resolution, discipline and valor becoming men fighting, as you are, for all worth living and dying for. You can but march to a decided victory over *agrarian mercenaries*, sent to subjugate you and to despoil you of your liberties, property and honor.

"Remember the precious stake involved! Remember the dependence of your mothers, your wives, your sisters and your children on the result! Remember the fair, broad, abounding lands, the happy homes that will be desolated by your defeat! The eyes and hopes of eight millions of people rest upon you!" etc., etc.

man's division,) pushed forward to Shiloh. Buell's divisions advancing south from Nashville were those of Generals Nelson, Mitchell, Crittenden, McCook and Thomas. These were followed by the divisions of Generals Wood and Negeley, which were encamped closely around Nashville. At the moment of the arrangement regarding the junction of the forces at or near Savannah, preparatory to a combined attack on Corinth, Mitchell's forces were pushed forward to Murfreesboro; and, as a part of the programme, suddenly struck down upon the Charleston and Memphis railroad to break that important line of rebel communication with the East. The divisions of McCook, Thomas, Crittenden and Nelson were on the Columbia road, stretching from Duck river to Rutherford creek. The divisions of Wood and Negeley, as stated, were at Nashville.

Ascertaining, with their usual success, the plans of the Federals, the rebel Generals determined to strike at a moment when a blow was not expected—to surprise the advance Union divisions, and, by pressing them in with an overwhelming force, to create a panic and thus drive them over the Tennessee. That this was their design the conflict which followed proved

FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BATTLE TO THE PUBLIC.

The first news which reached the North and East was dated from Fort Henry, April 9th, giving a hurried general announcement of the two days' struggle—a somewhat exaggerated, but in the main correct, statement of the fight—which was published in *extras*, and served to create the most intense excitement among all classes. Bulletin boards were everywhere besieged—newspaper offices were thronged—telegraph stations were fairly beleaguered—everybody was a news messenger to his neighbor, and all awaited further particulars with a most painful interest. The army engaged was composed almost wholly of western men. Probably every county and town of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin were represented there. The exaggerated report of twenty thousand killed and wounded could but cause the most harrowing suspense. The first announcement above referred to was, in part, as follows:

"PITTSBURG, *via* Fort Henry, April 9th, 3.20 A. M.

"One of the greatest and bloodiest battles of modern days has just closed, resulting in the complete rout of the enemy, who attacked us at daybreak Sunday morning.

"The battle lasted without intermission during the entire day, and was again renewed on Monday morning, and continued undecided until four o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy commenced their retreat, and are still flying toward Corinth, pursued by a large force of our cavalry.

"The slaughter on both sides is immense. We have lost in killed, and wounded, and missing, from eighteen to twenty thousand; that of the enemy is estimated at from thirty-five to forty thousand.

"The fight was brought on by a body of three hundred of the 25th Missouri regiment, of General Prentiss' division, attacking the advance guard of the rebels, which were supposed to be the pickets of the enemy, in front of our camps. The rebels immediately advanced on General Prentiss' division on the left wing,* pouring volley after volley of musketry, and riddling our camps with grape, canister and shell. Our forces soon formed into line, and returned their fire vigorously; but by the time we were prepared to receive them, they had turned their heaviest fire on the left center, Sherman's division, and drove our men back from their camps, and bringing up a fresh force, opened fire on our left wing, under General McClelland. This fire was returned with terrible effect and determined spirit by both infantry and artillery along the whole line, for a distance of over four miles.

"General Hurlburt's division was thrown forward to support the center, when a desperate conflict ensued. The rebels were driven back with terrible slaughter, but soon rallied and drove back our men in turn. From about nine o'clock, the time your correspondent arrived on the field, until night closed on the bloody scene, there was no determination of the result of the struggle. The rebel regiments exhibited remarkably good generalship. At times engaging the left with

* This account, in common with most all others made by newspaper reporters, was incorrect in the particulars of the enemy's first advance. By referring to the narrative following, (page 16,) the reader will find the correct statement of the first assault.

apparently their whole strength, they would suddenly open a terrible and destructive fire on the right or center. Even our heaviest and most destructive fire upon the enemy did not appear to discourage their solid columns. The fire of Major Taylor's Chicago artillery raked them down in scores, but the smoke would no sooner be dispersed than the breach would again be filled.

"The most desperate fighting took place late in the afternoon. The rebels knew that if they did not succeed in whipping us then, that their chances for success would be extremely doubtful, as a portion of General Buell's forces had by this time arrived on the opposite side of the river, and another portion was coming up the river from Savannah. They became aware that we were being reinforced, as they could see General Buell's troops from the river-bank, a short distance above us on the left, to which point they had forced their way.

"At five o'clock the rebels had forced our left wing back so as to occupy fully two-thirds of our camp, and were fighting their way forward with a desperate degree of confidence in their efforts to drive us into the river, and at the same time heavily engaged our right.

"Up to this time we had received no reinforcements, General Lew. Wallace failing to come to our support until the day was over, having taken the wrong road from Crump's Landing, and being without other transports than those used for Quartermaster's and Commissary stores, which were too heavily laden to ferry any considerable number of General Buell's forces across the river, those that were here having been sent to bring up the troops from Savannah. We were, therefore, contesting against fearful odds, our force not exceeding thirty-eight thousand men, while that of the enemy was upward of sixty thousand.

"Our condition at this moment was extremely critical. Large numbers of men panic-stricken, others worn out by hard fighting, with the average percentage of skulkers, had struggled toward the river, and could not be rallied. General Grant and staff, who had been recklessly riding along the lines during the entire day, amid the unceasing storm of bullets, grape and shell, now rode from right to left, inciting

the men to stand firm until our reinforcements could cross the river.

"Colonel Webster, Chief of Staff, immediately got into position the heaviest pieces of artillery, pointing on the enemy's right, while a large number of the batteries were planted along the entire line, from the river-bank north-west to our extreme right, some two and a half miles distant. About an hour before dusk a general cannonading was opened upon the enemy from along our whole line, with a perpetual crack of musketry. Such a roar of artillery was never heard on this continent. For a short time the rebels replied with vigor and effect, but their return shots grew less frequent and destructive, while ours grew more rapid and more terrible.

"The gunboats *Lexington* and *Tyler*, which lay a short distance off, kept raining shell on the rebel hordes. This last effort was too much for the enemy, and, ere dusk had set in, the firing had nearly ceased, when night coming on, all the combatants rested from their awful work of blood and carnage."

Then followed a list of the leading officers known to have been killed or wounded. It was meager, but gave names enough to plunge the country into mourning. Over Congress it threw a shadow which was betokened by the silence reigning in the halls after the news was received. That splendid army of the Union comprised some of the country's bravest spirits among its commanders, and all dreaded to read the lists which were hourly looked for after the receipt of the first news. The dispatch added:

"There has never been a parallel to the gallantry and bearing of our officers, from the commanding General to the lowest officer. General Grant and staff were in the field, riding along the lines in the thickest of the enemy's fire during the entire two days of the battle, and all slept on the ground Sunday night, during a heavy rain. On several occasions General Grant got within range of the enemy's guns, and was discovered and fired upon. Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson had his horse shot from under him when alongside of General Grant. General Sherman had two horses killed under him, and General McClelland shared like dangers; also General Hurlburt, each of whom received bullet-holes through

their clothes. General Buell remained with his troops during the entire day, and with General Crittenden and General Nelson, rode continually along the lines encouraging the men."

NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS.

The public did not wait long for further news. The leading journals of Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis, all had special correspondents with the army, and to them is the country indebted for the lengthy and exciting if not entirely trustworthy accounts of the battle, which soon found their way over the country. The best of them, however, were rather the picturesque narratives of partial and excited observers, than correct statements of those familiar with the details and *ensemble* of the whole affair. Their guesses, positive declarations of fact based on current rumor, adoption of views based on their own meager knowledge of military affairs, did not give the world the most correct versions of the affair; still, being nothing but observers, they were valuable witnesses, and from their letters we shall be able to glean much interesting data. The reports of the commanders shall, however, be our main reliance.

SCENE OF THE CONFLICT.

The place chosen for the struggle occupied a semicircle of about three and a half miles from the town of Pittsburg, the Federal forces being stationed in the form of a semicircle, the right resting on a point north of Crump's Landing, the center being directly in front of the main road to Corinth, and the left extending to the river, in the direction of Hamburg—a small place four miles north of Pittsburg Landing.

Pittsburg Landing is in Hardin county, Tenn., two hundred and forty miles from the mouth of the Tennessee river, ten miles from Savannah, and fifteen miles from the Mississippi border. It is marked by two houses, on an eminence of about fifty feet above the river. These houses were thoroughly riddled by the gunboats when the national force first approached, having been used as quarters for the enemy. The Landing was the leading point of shipment and receipt for the produce and goods of all that section of country, prior to the completion of the Memphis and Charleston railway.

The country stretched away from the Landing along a broad ridge, which was pierced at intervals by deep ravines, running mostly in a south-westerly direction, and covered with scrub-oak growing so closely together as to render it impossible for either cavalry or infantry to pass among the trees without great confusion. This "black-jack" thicket the Confederates effectually used as a covert. It is stated that from the river-bank to the furthest line of the national camps there were but three open fields, of from fifteen to twenty-five acres each. It was when the enemy endeavored to cross these, into the heavier forest on the top of the ridge, that our troops were enabled to do them the most damage.

DISPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL FORCES.

Grant had advanced his entire forces over the Tennessee, and only awaited the coming up of Buell's divisions to assail the enemy intrenched at Corinth. Sherman's division had the extreme advance, left wing, supported by General Prentiss; McClelland held the left center; W. H. L. Wallace (commanding General Smith's forces) held the left right; Hurlburt's fine brigades formed the reserve; General Lew Wallace's division was stationed at Crump's Landing, forming the Federal extreme right wing.

RECONNOISSANCES BY THE ENEMY.

The skirmishes of Friday and Saturday (April 4th and 5th) with the enemy's cavalry, served to keep Sherman's men on the alert. On Friday the Federal pickets were driven in on the main line of the division, with a loss of one Lieutenant and seven men. Sherman ordered a charge, when the rebel cavalry were, in turn, driven five miles, with a considerable loss. Saturday the well-mounted rebels again made a bold push at the lines, in considerable force, and retired after a warm reception. All these advances were reconnoissances to test the Federal spirit and to locate his lines.

THE FEDERALS NOT SURPRISED.

On Sunday morning early, April 6th, the Federal advance pickets were again driven in on the main line. Sherman immediately ordered the entire division under arms. The

forces thus prepared awaited the enemy's coming for some time. At seven o'clock, no further advance being made, Sherman with his entire staff rode to the front, his forces composed and disposed as follows :

1st Brigade—Composed of 6th Iowa, Col. J. A. McDowell ; 40th Illinois, Col. Hicks ; 46th Ohio, Col. Worthington ; and the Morton Battery—on the extreme right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road, over Owl creek.

2d Brigade—Composed of 55th Illinois, Col. D. Stuart ; 54th Ohio, Col. T. Kilby Smith ; 71st Ohio, Col. Mason—on the extreme left, guarding the ford over Lick creek.

3d Brigade—Composed of 77th Ohio, Col. Hildebrand ; 53d Ohio, Col. Appler ; 57th Ohio, Col. Munger—on the left of the Corinth road, its right resting on Shiloh Meeting House.

4th Brigade—Composed of 72d Ohio, Col. Buckland ; 48th Ohio, Col. Sullivan ; 70th Ohio, Col. Cockerill ; on the right of the Corinth road, its left resting on Shiloh Meeting House.

Two batteries of Artillery—Taylor's and Waterhouse's—were posted, the former at Shiloh and the latter on a ridge to the left, with a front fire over open ground, between Munger's and Appler's regiments. The cavalry and companies of the 4th Illinois, under Colonel Dickey, were posted in a large open field to the left and rear of Shiloh Meeting House, which Sherman regarded as the center of his position.

When the General and his staff were in front of the 53d Ohio, in an open field, the enemy's pickets opened fire on them, killing the General's orderly. The fire came from a covert of bushes lining a small stream which flowed north, along Sherman's whole front line. In the valley of this stream the enemy formed for his advance. Sherman witnessed his movements and became aware that the threatened conflict with the enemy in force was at hand. There was no "surprise." The division had been under arms ever since six o'clock, waiting the expected assault. Sherman, in his very clearly written report said :

"About eight A. M. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry to our left front, in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack on our whole camp. All the regiments of my division were then in line of

battle at their proper posts. I rode to Colonel Appler and ordered him to hold his ground at all hazards, as he held the left flank of our first line of battle, and I informed him that he had a good battery on his right and strong supports to his rear. General McClermand had promptly and energetically responded to my request, and had sent me three regiments, which were posted to protect Waterhouse's battery and the left flank of my line."

This proves that there was no surprise whatever. McClermand had been informed as early as half past six of the enemy's presence, and had placed his troops in order of battle. The same with Prentiss and Hurlbut—both of whom were ready long before the assault on Sherman's front.*

THE BATTLE.

The struggle commenced by the enemy's advance in force on Sherman's center, and the simultaneous opening of a battery in the woods, which shelled the Federal camp. Taylor and Waterhouse promptly responded. Under cover of their own battery, the rebel advance, by heavy battalions of infantry, was made obliquely to the left, across the open field in front of the 53d Ohio, while solid columns came in, direct, upon Sherman's front. Immediately the entire line opened fire, and the battle became general. The enemy's design was to left-flank Sherman. To this end he flung himself with terrific force upon Prentiss. Sherman says: "I saw at once that the enemy designed to pass my left flank and fall upon Generals McClermand and Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with the Tennessee river, and about two miles back from it. Very soon the sound of musketry and artillery announced that Prentiss was engaged, and about nine A. M. I judged that he was falling back. About this time Appler's regiment broke in disorder, followed by Munger's regiment, and the enemy pressed forward on Waterhouse's battery thereby exposed. The three Illinois regiments in immediate support of this battery stood for some time, but the enemy's advance

* This silences the calumny of the various newspaper correspondents, particularly those of the Cincinnati and Chicago press, whose reiterated assertions of a surprise—of the unprotected nature of our advance—of the refusal of Grant to allow reconnoitering—for a while did the commanding General great injury. *Their* correspondence, at least, needed a "censorship."

was so vigorous, and the fire so severe, that when Colonel Raith, of the 43d Illinois, received a severe wound and fell from his horse, his regiment and the others manifested disorder, and the enemy got possession of three guns of this (Waterhouse's) battery. Although our left was thus turned, and the enemy was pressing our whole line, I deemed Shiloh so important that I remained by it, and renewed my orders to Colonels McDowell and Buckland to hold their ground, and we did hold these positions until about ten o'clock A. M., when the enemy had got his artillery to the rear of our left flank, and some change became absolutely necessary. Two regiments of Hildebrand's brigade—Appler's and Munger's—had already disappeared to the rear, and Hildebrand's own regiment was in disorder. I therefore gave orders for Taylor's battery—still at Shiloh—to fall back as far as the Purdy and Hamburg road; and for McDowell and Buckland to adopt that road as their new line. I rode across the angle and met Behr's battery at the cross-roads, and ordered it immediately to come into battery action right. Captain Behr gave the order, but he was almost immediately shot from his horse, when drivers and gunners fled in disorder, carrying off the caissons, and abandoning five out of the six guns without firing a shot. The enemy pressed on after gaining this battery, and we were again forced to choose a line of defense. Hildebrand's brigade had substantially disappeared from the field, though he himself bravely remained. McDowell's and Buckland's brigades still maintained their organizations, and were conducted by my aids so as to join on McClelland's right, thus abandoning my original camps and line."

General Hurlbut's report comes in here to enlighten us on this moment of disaster. He says: "About half past seven I received a message from Brigadier-General Sherman that he was attacked in force and heavily upon his left. I immediately ordered Colonel I. C. Veatch, commanding the 2d brigade, to proceed to the left of General Sherman. This brigade, consisting of the 25th Indiana, 14th, 15th, and 46th Illinois, was in march in ten minutes, arrived on General Sherman's left and went into action rapidly." With what result is thus told by Major John W. Foster, of the 25th Indiana: "In a few minutes we were in line of battle, and moving forward to the attack.

We had hardly left the camp before we saw the roads full of our flying men, and all along the route for the two miles we passed over, were strewn guns, knapsacks and blankets, and we found, to our dismay, that our front had been completely surprised, one whole division scattered and retreating in utter confusion, and the enemy in force already a mile within our camps. We were drawn up in line of battle, our brigade, under command of Colonel Veatch, in a skirt of timber bordering a large field, on the outer edge of which our troops were engaging the enemy. But the enemy pressed on in overwhelming force, and just as the troops in front of us began to waver, we discovered that the enemy had flanked us on the right and was rapidly advancing (in what force we knew not, but the woods were perfectly swarming) to attack our brigade on the right and rear. So it became necessary for us to change our front to the rear to meet them.

“The 15th Illinois was on the right, the 14th Illinois in the center, and the 25th Indiana on the left—the other regiment, the 46th Illinois, by the rapid flanking of the enemy becoming detached from the brigade, was not with us again during the whole action. This brought the first fire upon the 15th Illinois, which stood it nobly, but was soon overpowered; likewise the 14th. In the mean time the troops in front and on the left were completely routed by the enemy, and came pell-mell right through our lines, causing some little confusion, and hardly had they passed through to the rear before the enemy were upon us, and here the fire of musketry was most terrible.

“Our men tried to stand up to it, but every thing was breaking to pieces all around us, and it was more than we could do, short of annihilation. We poured in a few well-directed volleys, and reluctantly left the field—many of our men firing as they fell back. The loss here was very heavy. All the field officers of the 25th Illinois were killed instantly, and many commissioned officers; two of our Lieutenants were killed and three wounded, and one of our Captains is either killed or a prisoner.”

It is hardly to be wondered that the raw regiments flinched under this appalling fire, before which veteran troops were powerless to stand without annihilation. Yet it must be said that Hildebrand's brigade evidently had no stomach for the

fight, since no command or entreaty of officers—no appeal to their patriotism or to their sense of shame—no taunt of cowardice or threats of disgrace could call them again into action.* They drifted through the lines of McClernand and Hurlbut, and, for the rest of the day found safety and repose under the river's bank, ready at any moment to seize the transports should danger threaten their lurking-place.

Sherman, in his account, continued: "This was about half past ten A.M., at which time the enemy had made a furious attack on General McClernand's whole front. He struggled most determinedly, but finding him pressed, I moved McDowell's brigade directly against the left flank of the enemy, forced him back some distance, and then directed the men to avail themselves of every cover, trees, fallen timber, and a wooded valley to our right; we held this position for four long hours, sometimes gaining and at others losing ground, General McClernand and myself acting in perfect concert and struggling to maintain this line. While we were so hardly pressed, two Iowa regiments approached from the rear, but could not be brought up to the severe fire that was raging."

What this fire was the correspondent of the *Cincinnati Times* tells us: "By eleven o'clock, quite a number of the commanders of regiments had fallen, and in some cases not a single field officer remained; yet the fighting continued with an earnestness which plainly showed that the contest on both sides was for death or victory. The almost deafening sound of artillery, and the rattle of the musketry, were all that could be heard as the men stood and silently delivered their fire, evidently bent on the work of destruction with a fervor which knew no bounds. Foot by foot the ground was contested, a

* Sherman said, in extenuation of their conduct: "My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, nearly all having received their muskets for the first time at Paducah. None of them had been under fire, or beheld heavy columns of an enemy bearing down on them as they did on last Sunday. To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of older troops would be wrong. They knew not the value of combination and organization; when individual fear seized them, the first impulse was to get away."

"My third brigade did break much too soon, and I am not yet advised where they were Sunday afternoon and Monday morning. Colonel Hildebrand, its commander, was as cool as any man I ever saw, and no one could have made stronger efforts to hold his men to their place than he did. He kept his own regiment, with individual exceptions, in hand an hour after Apple's and Munger's regiments had left their proper field of action. Colonel Buckland managed his brigade well."

single narrow strip of open land dividing the opponents. Not having had time, in their hasty departure from their camps, to bring forward the hand-stretchers so necessary for the easy transportation of the wounded; such available means as were at hand were adopted, and the soldier's outstretched blanket received his crippled comrade, as the only available method by which he could be carried to the rear. Many who were maimed fell back without help, while others still fought in the ranks until they were actually forced back by their company officers.

Hurlbut's division, in reserve, saved the first repulse from proving an absolute defeat, by offering a line behind which the discomfited divisions of Sherman and Prentiss could re-form, while his solid ranks were a wall of fire against which the enemy could not prevail. The General, in his report, says of their five hours' service ;

"Receiving from General Prentiss a pressing request for aid, I took command in person of the 1st and 3d brigades, respectively commanded by Colonel N. G. Williams, of the 3d Iowa, and Brigadier-General Laumann. The 1st brigade consisted of the 3d Iowa, 41st Illinois, 28th Illinois and 32d Illinois. The 3d brigade was composed of the 31st and 44th Indiana, the 17th and 25th Kentucky.

"In addition, I took with me the 1st and 2d battalions of the 5th Ohio cavalry; Mann's light battery of four pieces commanded by first Lieutenant E. Brotzmann; Ross' battery of the 2d Michigan; and Meyer's battery of the 13th Ohio."

The General then states these interesting particulars: "As we drew near the rear and left of General Prentiss' line, his regiments, in broken masses, drifted through my advance, that gallant officer making every effort to rally them.

"I formed my line of battle—the 1st brigade thrown to the front on the southerly side of a large open field—the 3d brigade continuing the line with an obtuse angle around the other side of the field, and extending some distance into the brush and timber. Mann's battery was placed in the angle of the lines, Ross' battery some distance to the left, and the 13th Ohio battery on the right, and somewhat advanced in cover of the timber, so as to concentrate the fire upon the open ground in front, and waited for the attack.

"A single shot from the enemy's batteries struck in Meyer's 13th Ohio battery, when officers and men, with a common impulse of disgraceful cowardice, abandoned the entire battery—horses, caissons and guns—and fled, and I saw them no more until Tuesday. I called for volunteers from the artillery; the call was answered, and ten gallant men from Mann's battery and Ross' battery brought in the horses, which were wild, and spiked the guns."

The incident here related formed one of the most mortifying episodes of the battle,* and, added to the cowardice of the 77th and 53d Ohio, tarnished the honor of the State, in a degree; though the splendor of the service rendered by the rest of the Ohio men covered their State with glory. Hurlbut continued his narrative:

"The attack commenced on the 3d brigade through the thick timber, and was met and repelled by a steady and continuous fire which rolled the enemy back in confusion after some half-hour of struggle, leaving many dead and wounded. The glimmer of bayonets on the left and front of the 1st brigade showed a large force of the enemy gathering, and an attack was soon made on the 41st Illinois and 28th, on the left of the brigade, and the 32d Illinois and 3d Iowa on the right. At the same time a strong force of very steady and gallant troops formed in columns, doubled on the center and advanced over the open field in front. They were allowed to approach within four hundred yards, when fire was opened from Mann's and Ross' batteries, and from the two right regiments of the 1st brigade, and 17th and 25th Kentucky, which were thrown forward slightly, so as to flank the column. Under this withering fire they vainly attempted to deploy, but soon broke and fell back under cover, leaving not less than 150 dead and wounded as evidence how our troops maintained their position. The attack on the left was also repulsed, but as the ground was covered with brush, the loss could not be judged.

"General Prentiss having succeeded in rallying a considerable portion of his command, I permitted him to pass to the front of the right of my 3d brigade, where they redeemed their honor by maintaining that line for some time while

* The battery was mustered out of service, its men disgraced, and its officers branded with cowardice.

ammunition was supplied to my regiments. A series of attacks upon the right and left of my line were readily repelled until I was compelled to order Ross' battery to the rear, on account of its loss in men and horses. During all this time, Mann's battery maintained its fire steadily, effectively, and with great rapidity, under the excellent handling of Lieutenant E. Brotzmann.

"For five hours these brigades maintained their position under repeated and heavy attacks, and endeavored with their thin ranks to hold the space between Stewart's and McClelland's, and did check every attempt to penetrate the lines."

The fight at this point—the left wing—raged with unabated fury. The *Times* correspondent wrote:

"With the first demonstration of the enemy upon the left wing, it was to be seen that all the fury was being poured out upon it with the determination that it should give way. For nearly two hours a sheet of fire blazed from both columns, and I could liken the explosion of the small-arms to nothing save a cane-brake in a state of conflagration. The Mississippi riflemen, a large and well-organized body of good marksmen and desperate men, fought with a valor that was only equaled by those who received their unerring fire, and returned it with an energy which assured them that many of those who had endured the fire of Donelson were in the ranks before them.

"In this quarter it seemed, for the period of nearly an hour, that the enemy would succeed in driving our forces. Three different times they drove our men slowly before them, until they came in sight of the river, and were plainly visible even to those on the main landing below. Up to three o'clock, it will be remembered, the battle had raged with a fury which defies description. At every point the rebels had found every attempt to break our lines unavailing. They had striven to drive in our main column, and finding that impossible, had turned all their strength upon our left wing. Foiled in that quarter, they now made another attack on the center, and fought like tigers. They found our lines well prepared for and in full expectation of their coming; every man to his post, and all waiting to bring the contest to a definite conclusion.

"In hourly expectation of the arrival of the forces under

Generals Nelson and Thomas, who were at Savannah, and to whom messages had been sent, a fact as well known to the secessionists as ourselves, they made every effort to rout our forces before these reinforcements should have come forward. They were, however, fighting against a wall of fire and steel, manned by as brave hearts as ever smelled the essence of gunpowder. Volley answered to volley, and for a time the battle of the morning was reënacted over the same ground, and with the same vigor on both sides.

“At five o'clock there was a short cessation in the firing of the enemy, their lines falling back on the center for the distance, perhaps, of nearly a mile. They then suddenly wheeled and again threw their entire force upon the left wing, determined to make the final struggle of the day in that quarter. The gunboat *Lexington*, in the mean time, had arrived from Savannah, and, after sending a messenger to General Grant to ascertain the direction in which the enemy lay from the river, the two boats took position about half a mile above the landing, and poured their shell up a deep ravine reaching to the river on their right. The shots were thick and fast, and told with a thrilling effect.

“In the mean time, General Wallace had taken a circuitous route from Crump's Landing, and appeared suddenly on the right wing of the enemy. In face of this combination of circumstances, the rebels felt that their enterprise was for the day a failure, and, as night was about at hand, they slowly fell back, fighting as they went, until they reached an advantageous position, somewhat in the rear, and yet occupying the main road to Corinth. The gunboats continued to send their shell after them until they had entirely got beyond their reach. Thus ends an outline of the battle of the first day.”

The last paragraph contains an error. General Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing not until after nightfall, and his division took no part in the first day's action. It was the division of General W. H. L. Wallace, under command of Colonel Tuttle, which held the enemy at bay in their last effort to break our lines. Colonel Tuttle, in his report to Brigadier-General McArthur, (General Wallace being mortally wounded, the command devolved upon General McArthur; he being also wounded, Colonel Tuttle, as senior in rank, took the division command,) said:

“On the morning of the 6th, I proceeded with my brigade, consisting of the 2d, 7th, 12th and 14th Iowa infantry, under the direction of Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, and formed line on the left of his division. We had been in line but a few moments, when the enemy made their appearance and attacked my left wing, (12th and 13th Iowa,) who gallantly stood their ground, and compelled the assailants to retire in confusion. They again formed under cover of a battery, and renewed the attack upon my whole line, but were repulsed as before.

“A third and fourth time they dashed upon us, but were each time baffled and completely routed. We held our position about six hours, when it became evident that our forces on each side of us had given way, so as to give the enemy an opportunity of turning both our flanks. At this critical juncture, General Wallace gave orders for my whole brigade to fall back, which was done in good order. The 2d and 7th regiments retired through a severe fire from both flanks, and re-formed, while the 12th and 14th, who were delayed by their endeavors to save a battery which had been placed in their rear, were completely cut off and surrounded, and were compelled to surrender.

“In passing through the cross-fire, General Wallace fell mortally wounded, and, as you were reported wounded, and Captain McMichael informing me that I was the ranking officer, I assumed command of the division, and rallied what was left of my brigade, and was joined by the 13th Iowa, Colonel Crooker, 9th Illinois, Colonel Mersy, 12th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Chottain, and several other fragments of regiments, and formed in line on the road, and held the enemy in check until the line was formed that resisted the last charge just before dark of that day.”

The new line formed to resist the last charge comprised General Buell's forces of eight thousand, led by Buell and General Nelson. This opportune arrival, by a forced march, within sound of the guns, brought them to the scene of action at that critical moment when the fate of the conflict hung in the balance. The men, though weary from their long march, formed behind the still unfaltering divisions of Sherman, McClelland, Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace—the latter, as

recorded, being led by Colonel Tuttle. Hurlbut's forces had, in common with the entire left wing, been pressed to the river line. His lucid report of the afternoon's work of his regiments and artillery, and of the disposition made for the last stand, we give :

“ When, about three o'clock, Colonel Stewart, on my left, sent me word that he was driven in, and that I would be flanked on the left in a few moments, it was necessary for me to decide at once to abandon either the right or left. I considered that General Prentiss could, with the left of General McClelland's troops, probably hold the right, and sent him notice* to reach out toward the right, and drop back steadily parallel with my 1st brigade, while I rapidly moved General Lanmann from the right to the left, and called up two 20-pounder pieces of Major Cavender's battalion to check the advance of the enemy upon the 1st brigade. These pieces were taken into action by Dr. Corvine, the surgeon of the battalion, and Lieutenant Edwards, and effectually checked the enemy for half an hour, giving me time to draw off my crippled artillery, and to form a new front with the 3d brigade. In a few minutes, two Texan regiments crossed the ridge separating my line from Stewart's former one, while other troops also advanced.

“ Willard's battery was thrown into position, under command of Lieutenant Wood, and opened with great effect on the Lone Star flags, until their line of fire was obstructed by the charge of the 3d brigade, which, after delivering its fire with great steadiness, charged full up the hill, and drove the enemy three or four hundred yards. Perceiving that a heavy force was closing on the left, between my line and the river, while heavy fire continued on the right and front, I ordered the line to fall back. The retreat was made quietly and steadily, and in good order. I had hoped to make a stand on the line of my camp, but masses of the enemy were pressing rapidly on each flank, while their light artillery was closing rapidly in the rear. On reaching the 24-pounder siege guns in battery, near the river, I again succeeded in forming line of battle in rear of the guns, and, by direction of Major-General Grant, I assumed command of all troops that came

* Hurlbut was not then aware that Prentiss and many men from four of his regiments were prisoners, at that moment, in the enemy's hands.

up. Broken regiments and disordered battalions came into line gradually upon my division.

“Major Cavender posted six of his 20-pound pieces on my right, and I sent my aid to establish the light artillery, all that could be found, on my left. Many officers and men unknown to me, and whom I never desire to know, fled in confusion through the line. Many gallant soldiers and brave officers rallied steadily on the new line. I passed to the right and found myself in communication with General Sherman, and received his instructions. In a short time the enemy appeared on the crest of the ridge, led by the 13th Louisiana, but were cut to pieces by the steady and murderous fire of the artillery. Dr. Corvine again took charge of one of the heavy 24-pounders, and the line of fire of that gun was the one upon which the other pieces concentrated. General Sherman’s artillery also was rapidly engaged, and, after an artillery contest of some duration, the enemy fell back.

“Captain Gwinn, U. S. N., had called upon me by one of his officers, to mark the place the gunboats might take to open their fire. I advised him to take position on the left of my camp-ground, and open fire as soon as our fire was within that line. He did so, and from my own observation and the statement of prisoners, his fire was most effectual in stopping the advance of the enemy on Sunday afternoon and night.”

The gunboats *Tyler*, Lieutenant Wm. Gwinn commanding, and *Lexington*, Lieutenant James W. Shirk commanding, performed signal service. At fifty minutes past two, the *Tyler* opened fire, as directed by General Hurlbut, doing the enemy immense harm, and striking terror into his ranks. The great bombs careered through the air in quick succession, hurtling death and destruction throughout all those oak-jungles under whose cover the enemy fought so securely. The *Lexington* came up at four P. M., when the two boats took a position about three-fourths of a mile above Pittsburg Landing, where the enemy’s right could be reached. The bombardment silenced the Confederate batteries in less than thirty minutes. Lieutenant Gwinn, in his report to Commodore Foote, (the boats belonging to Foote’s flotilla,) said :

“At thirty-five minutes past five, the rebels having succeeded in gaining a position on the left of our line—an eighth of a mile

above the landing at Pittsburg, and a half-mile from the river—both vessels opened a heavy and well-directed fire on them, and in a short time, in conjunction with our artillery on shore, succeeded in silencing their artillery, and driving them back in confusion.

“At six P. M., the *Tyler* opened deliberate fire in direction of the rebel right wing, throwing five and ten-inch shell. At twenty-five minutes past six, ceased firing. At nine P. M., the *Tyler* again opened fire, by direction of General Nelson, who greatly distinguished himself in yesterday’s engagement, throwing five, ten and fifteen-inch shell, and an occasional shrapnell from the howitzer, at intervals of ten minutes, in direction of the rebel right wing, until one A. M., when the *Lexington* relieved us, and continued the fire at intervals of fifteen minutes, until five A. M., when, our land forces having attacked the enemy, forcing them gradually back, it became dangerous for the gunboats to fire.”

Had the gunboats been less available—had our artillery been less efficiently served—had Buell’s coming been delayed one hour—the day would, indeed, have been one of sad disaster to the Union cause. Beauregard’s promise of victory would have been redeemed, and Johnston’s promise to defeat Buell and regain Nashville might have had an early fulfillment.

How nearly we came to such a disaster few care to contemplate. The reader will infer from Hurlbut’s report that the field was really lost. If any one be disposed to doubt it, the testimony of acting witnesses is not wanting to prove the impending reverse on the evening of the bloody day.

McClermand’s fine division comprised the right of the advance divisions. It came into action after the Confederate onslaught had driven in the regiments of Prentiss, after having engaged Sherman’s entire line. McClermand led in person, and kept his men in excellent order even where the enemy had pressed him back. Beauregard commanded the section of the rebel army pitted against McClermand, and maneuvered his men with masterly skill—as, indeed, did all the rebel Generals during the entire two days’ conflict.*

* One who was present wrote:—“The generalship on the part of the Confederates was consummate—far exceeding ours, and deserving, from a military point of view, the highest admiration. The most unexpected movements were made. When we attacked a certain point we met with

McClelland plotted and counterplotted with shrewdness and discretion, and maintained, or retired from, his positions with great deliberation. His charges are represented as having been brilliant, and twice gave a shock to the advancing hosts which drove them back and gave the Union army new courage. For nearly six hours his regiments stood up to the work. Then it became apparent that the enemy had been reinforced and was rapidly turning his (McClelland's) right, at the same time that the entire lines were being pushed backward by the outnumbering Confederates. The Illinois General asked aid from Hurlbut's division. Colonel Veatch, with the remnant of the 2d brigade, passed over to McClelland's lines, taking position on his left. The 14th Illinois pushed forward to flank the foe, while the 25th Indiana, Major Foster commanding, pressed up close, as a support. Major Foster wrote:—"The 14th Illinois flanked them, and was just beginning to pour upon them a heavy fire, while we were moving up to the assistance of the 14th in fine style, when the whole mass of our left, which had for five or six hours been steadily and stubbornly contesting the victorious advance of the enemy in that direction, gave way in all directions, about half-past three, and came sweeping by us in utter and total confusion—cavalry, ambulances, artillery, and thousands of infantry, all in one mass, while the enemy were following closely in pursuit, at the same time throwing grape, canister and shells thick and fast among them. It was a time of great excitement and dismay—it appeared that all was lost; but I was unwilling to throw our regiment into the flying mass, only to be trampled to pieces and thoroughly disorganized and broken. So I held them back in the wash on the side of the road until the mass of the rout had passed, when I put my men in the rear of the retreat. This rout decided that day's work. We were driven back nearly to the river landing, but still the ground was strongly defended all the time, but the enemy kept pressing us in all the time, and if, at this time, they had made a bold and united charge all along their line, we would have been totally and utterly

resistance from a new quarter; when we moved to the right we were attacked on our left; when we advanced to the center a deadly fire was opened on us from the right; and so we were constantly deceived by the skill and strategy of our foes."

routed ; but a half-hour's apparent cessation of heavy firing gave our scattered forces time to rally, while the first two regiments of Buell's long-expected advance took position on the hill in the rear, and our forces fell back and formed with them near the landing for a final stand."

Of that last desperate struggle near the river's bank the Major wrote: "About five o'clock in the evening the enemy made a heavy charge and attempted to carry this position. The contest was most terrible—the roar of musketry was one continual peal for nearly half an hour. All that saved us, was two heavy siege pieces on the hill and the firmness of our men on this last stand. Night closed in on us, with almost the whole of our extensive camps in the hands of the enemy."

Sherman states, in his report: "We fell back as well as we could, gathering in addition to our own, such scattered forces as we could find, and formed the line. During this change the enemy's cavalry charged us, but were handsomely repulsed by an Illinois regiment, whose number I did not learn at that time or since. The 5th Ohio cavalry, which had come up, rendered good service in holding the enemy in check for some time, and Major Taylor also came up with a new battery, and got into position to get a good flank fire upon the enemy's column as he pressed on General McClelland's right, checking his advance ; when General McClelland's division made a fine charge on the enemy, and drove him back into the ravines to our front and right. I had a clear field about two hundred yards wide in my immediate front, and contented myself with keeping the enemy's infantry at that distance during the rest of the day. In this position we rested for the night."

No wonder Beauregard telegraphed a victory, and that the Confederates throughout the South, where a telegraph could speed them the news, should have rejoiced. To have given Buell's and Grant's advance a staggering blow—to spend the night in their tents, feasting, as Davis' unpaid patriots had not done for months, upon good rations and officers' luxuries, was indeed a victory for them, even if the morrow should send them hurtling back, a confused and broken mass to their intrenchments at Corinth.*

* The Memphis *Appeal* charges the defeat of the Confederates on Monday to the liquor found by their men in the Federal tents!

Thus closed one of the bloodiest of all the battles for the Union. It was, indeed, one of the most severely contested fields of modern times. The Union forces engaged—after counting out the six regiments whose cowardice or want of experience rendered them a source of annoyance—was about thirty-eight thousand. The addition of Buell's first reinforcement only served to keep that number good, since the dead, wounded and prisoners amounted fully to five thousand, while three thousand were out of the ranks either from exhaustion or on hospital duty. The enemy were reported to have had at the close of the day, for their last struggle, about forty-five thousand on the field, led in person by Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg, Hardee, Polk, Breckenridge and Cheaham. The troops comprised the very choicest of the "chivalry"—Mississippi "Tigers," Louisiana "Zouaves," Pensacola "Invincibles," Alabama "Avalanches," Georgia "Gladiators," consorting with Arkansas cut-throats and Texas desperadoes, to make up an army of the best fighting material which it is possible for the South to produce. Had they been opposed by men less skilled in arms and less confident in their own resources, the day would have been decided before noon. But, in the Northern regiments the Southerners met with more than their match. In endurance, cool courage and skill, the troops which stood the tremendous shocks of the foe were all that any field of battle ever witnessed.

Out of that awful contest this picture was drawn by one who rode over the field as an observer :

"Each man fought as if success or defeat depended on his own right arm; and charge after charge was made upon the rebels to regain the ground we had lost. They stood firm as a rock; and though our artillery often swept down their ranks and left fearful gaps in their columns, they manifested no trepidation, nor did they waver for a moment. The living supplied the place of the dead. The musket that had fallen from a lifeless hand was seized at once, and the horrid strife swept on as before. The force of the enemy appeared increasing, and where the greatest havoc was made, there the strongest opposition was shown. Hand-to-hand contests were innumerable. Every struggle was for life. Quarter was asked on neither side, and the ground drank up the blood of

hundreds of brave fellows every hour. Men lost their semblance of humanity, and the spirit of the demon shone in their faces. There was but one desire, and that was to destroy. There was little shouting. The warriors were too much in earnest. They set their teeth firm and strained their every nerve to its utmost tension. Death lost all its terrors, and men seemed to feast upon the sight of blood."

Of such ghastly features is the "grim front of war," only the reality is more painful, more horrible than words can express. Men to contemplate it with serenity must be demons indeed, or else they must be mastered by emotions higher and nobler than love of life or self—the love of a cause which Heaven consecrates.

SECOND DAY'S CONFLICT.

Buell arrived at Savannah on the evening of the 5th—where General Nelson's division also arrived the same day. The remaining divisions were coming on at intervals of six miles apart. The firing on the morning of the 6th was distinctly heard at Savannah. Sending order for the divisions to hasten up without their trains, Buell ordered Nelson to move down the left bank of the Tennessee to the Pittsburg Landing ferry, while he himself took steamer for the scene of hostilities.

Buell mentions, in his report, the fact of the disasters of the first day—stating that the crowd of demoralized men increased as he proceeded up the stream. He computed the mass at between four and five thousand men at the time of his arrival early in the day. Buell said :

"Late in the day it became much greater. Finding General Grant at the Landing, I requested him to send steamers to Savannah to bring up General Crittenden's division, which had arrived during the morning, and then went ashore with him. The throng of disorganized and demoralized troops increased continually by fresh fugitives from the battle which steadily drew nearer the Landing, and with these were intermingled great numbers of teams, all striving to get as near as possible to the river. With few exceptions, all efforts to form the troops and move them forward to the fight utterly failed. In

the mean time the enemy had made such progress against our troops that his artillery and musketry began to play into the vital spot of the position, and some persons were killed on the bank at the very Landing. General Nelson arrived with Colonel Ammen's brigade at this opportune moment. It was immediately posted to meet the attack at that point, and with a battery of artillery, which happened to be on the ground and was brought into action, opened fire on the enemy and repulsed him. The action of the gunboats also contributed very much to that result. The attack at that point was not renewed. Night having come on, the firing ceased on both sides."*

This was the only part taken by Buell's troops in the first day's struggle. The opportune arrival of Nelson's veterans turned the tide, and from that moment the disheartened and almost exhausted brigades of General Grant's army took new courage.

The remainder of Nelson's division came up and crossed the ferry early in the evening. Crittenden's division came on by steamers from Savannah. The batteries of Captains Mendenhall and Terrell, of the regular service, and Bartlett's Ohio battery, also came up. McCook's division, by a forced march, arrived at Savannah during the night of the 6th, and pushing on immediately, reached the Landing early on the morning of the 7th.

Buell's divisions, taking the Federal left wing, opened the day's work, soon after five o'clock, when Nelson's division moved forward upon the enemy's pickets, driving them in. The rebel artillery opened at six o'clock on Nelson's lines.

Grant gave the right Federal wing to General Lew Wallace's fine division of fresh men. Sherman's broken brigades again assumed the field, taking position next to Wallace. On the right the attack commenced early after daybreak, by Thompson's artillery, which opened on a rebel battery occupying a bluff to the front and right of Wallace's 1st brigade.

* Nelson, in his report stated, in regard to this demoralized crowd at the river's bank: "I found, cowering under the river-bank, when I crossed, from 7,000 to 10,000 men, frantic with fright, and utterly demoralized, who received my gallant division with cries that 'We are whipped,' 'Cut to pieces,' etc. They were insensible to shame and sarcasm, for I tried both on them, and, indignant at such poltroonry, I asked permission to open fire upon the knaves."

Behind that battery the enemy's infantry was gathered in strong force, evidently with the view of falling upon the Federal right, and by commanding the intervening hollow prevent Wallace's advance. Thurber's battery was immediately so posted that, with Thompson's guns, the enemy was under a cross-fire. The enemy was driven from his position, and fell back beyond the brow of the bluff. Wallace then advanced at a right angle with the river. Expecting coöperation from Sherman, he halted his forces to await the appearance of that commander's division.

Sherman had received orders from Grant to advance and recapture his camps. His division was now composed of odds and ends. Of it, as it came out of the conflict Sunday evening, he said :

"My command had become decidedly of a mixed character. Buckland's brigade was the only one that retained its organization. Colonel Hildebrand was personally there, but his brigade was not. Colonel McDowell had been severely injured by a fall of his horse, and had gone to the river, and the regiments of his brigade were not in line. The 13th Missouri, Colonel Crafts J. Wright, had reported to me on the field, and fought well, retaining its regimental organization, and it formed a part of my line during Sunday night and all Monday. Other fragments of regiments and companies had also fallen into my division, and acted with it during the remainder of the battle."

Certainly not a very promising host with which to "advance and recapture his camps." But, with such a commander as Sherman, the "I'll try" of the notable Miller is "I'll do it!" Receiving the orders as stated, he says : "I dispatched several of my staff to bring up all the men they could find, and especially the brigade of Colonel Stuart, (which had been separated from the division,) or, rather, what remained of it. With the 13th Missouri and other fragments, we moved forward and reoccupied the ground on the extreme right of General McClelland's camp, where we attracted the fire of a battery located near Colonel McDowell's head-quarters. Here I remained, patiently awaiting the sound of General Buell's advance upon the main Corinth road." It was this independent action of Sherman which caused Wallace to halt—he,

evidently, not understanding Sherman's design. Sherman did not long await the sound of Buell's cannon. He says: "About ten A. M. the heavy firing in this direction and its steady approach satisfied me, and leaving General Wallace to hold our right flank with his well-conducted division, I led the head of my column to General McClelland's right, formed line of battle facing south, with Buckland's brigade on its right in the woods, and thus advanced steadily and slowly under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. Taylor had just got to me from the rear, where he had gone for ammunition, and brought up three guns, which I ordered into position to advance by hand firing."

Observing that his right was protected by the impassable swamp formed by Snake creek, and that the enemy's left was exposed, Wallace determined to press it, if possible turn it. For that purpose, he stated in his report, "It became necessary for me to change front by a left half wheel of the whole division. While the movement was in progress, across a road through the woods at the southern end of the field we were resting by, I discovered a heavy column of rebels going rapidly to reinforce their left, which was still retiring, covered by skirmishers, with whom mine were engaged. Thompson's battery was ordered up and shelled the passing column with excellent effect, but while so engaged he was opened on by a full battery planted in the field just beyond the strip of woods on the right. He promptly turned his guns at the new enemy. A fine artillery duel ensued, very honorable to Thompson and his company. His ammunition giving out in the midst of it, I ordered him to retire, and Lieutenant Thurber to take his place. Thurber obeyed with such alacrity, that there was scarcely an intermission in the fire, which continued so long and with such warmth as to provoke the attempt on the part of the rebels to charge the position. Discovering the intention, the 1st brigade was brought across the field to occupy the strip of woods in front of Thurber. The cavalry made the first dash at the battery, but the skirmishers of the 9th Missouri poured an unexpected fire into them, and they retired pell-mell. Next the infantry attempted a charge; the 1st brigade easily repelled them. All this time my whole division was under a furious cannonade, but being well masked

behind the bluff, or resting in the hollows of the woods, the regiments suffered but little."

This affair only stayed the advance for a brief period. The cleared field in front was intersected by a willow-fringed stream. Over this the 1st and 2d brigades now pressed. The skirmishers in action all the way cleared the rise, and grouped themselves behind the ground-swells within seventy-five yards of the rebel lines. As the regiments approached them, suddenly a sheet of musketry blazed from the woods, and a battery opened upon them. About the same instant, the regiments supporting his left fell hastily back. To save his flank a halt was ordered. The wavering battalions soon recovered, when the two brigades pressed on with fixed bayonets. The rebels fell back into the woods, thus abandoning their first positions, which the Federals now held.

Fortune, however, wavered for a moment on the left of Wallace's well won position. Sherman advanced, under cover of the three guns of the Chicago Light Artillery (Company A, Lieutenant P. P. Wood commanding), until the line of McClernand's old camp was gained, on the Corinth road. There he first met Buell's column of veterans—such troops as only a military commander of the truest instincts can produce. Their steadiness and precision inspired the new recruits of Sherman's brigades with great confidence and enthusiasm. Willich's famous regiment advanced upon the enemy lurking, in heavy force, in a thicket of water-oaks. The reception by the enemy compelled even the invincible Indiana 32d to retire before it. The fire of musketry was perfectly astounding, and Colonel Willich came from the wood with sadly riddled ranks. It was evident that *there* was to be the great struggle of the day. Into the thicket, to support Buell's forces, Sherman now led his men. He says: "The enemy had one battery close to Shiloh, and another near the Hamburg road, both pouring grape and canister upon my column of troops that advanced upon the green point-of water oaks. Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully, deployed and entered this dreaded wood. I ordered my 2d brigade, then commanded by Colonel T. Kilby Smith, (Colonel Stuart being wounded,) to form on its right, and my 4th brigade, Colonel Buckland,

on its left, all to advance abreast with the Kentucky brigade before mentioned, which I afterward found to be Rosseau's brigade of McCook's division. I gave personal direction to the 24-pounder guns, whose well-directed fire first silenced the enemy's guns to the left, and afterward at the Shiloh Meeting House. Rosseau's brigade moved in splendid order steadily to the front, sweeping every thing before it, and at four P. M. stood upon the ground of our original front line, and the enemy was in full retreat. I directed my several brigades to resume at once their original camps."

This is telling the story of a desperate service modestly but well. Rosseau's report shows the fighting in and beyond the wood to have been of the most desperate character. Sherman gives the credit of success to McCook's division in these words:—"I consider that General McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along the Corinth road, which was the great center of this field of battle, where Beauregard commanded in person, supported by Bragg's, Polk's and Breckenridge's divisions."

McCook's division was composed as follows:

1st Brigade—Brigadier-General Lovell H. Rosseau: 1st Ohio, Colonel Ed. A. Parrott; 6th Indiana, Colonel Crittenden; 3d Kentucky, (Louisville Legion;) battalions 15th, 16th and 19th regulars.

2d Brigade—Brigadier-General Johnston (Colonel W. H. Gibson commanded this brigade on the 7th): 32d Indiana, Colonel Willich; 39th Indiana, Colonel Harrison; 49th Ohio, Colonel Gibson.

3d Brigade—Colonel Kirk, 34th Illinois, commanding: 34th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Badsworth; 29th Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Drum; 30th Indiana, Colonel Bass; 77th Pennsylvania, Colonel Stambaugh.

The center, under McClernand, in the mean while, had an obstinate and unyielding foe in its front. Thoroughly desperate at the chances of defeat, the rebels pressed upon the center, hoping to break it and thus to compel the wings to fall back again upon their river line. Hurlbut's brigade moved up to his support, taking his extreme left, where the fight raged with great fury, and where the fortunes of the day were only sustained by the unflinching tenacity of the Union

troops. It was a conflict where the last man would fall rather than retreat. One of the newspaper correspondents who was present on this section of the field wrote:—"It now became evident that the rebels were avoiding the extreme of the left wing, and endeavoring to find some weak point in the lines by which to turn our force, and thus create an irrevocable confusion. It is wonderful with what perseverance and determination they adhered to this purpose. They left one point but to return to it immediately, and then as suddenly would, by some masterly stroke of generalship, direct a most vigorous assault upon some division where they fancied they would not be expected. The fire of our lines was steady as clock-work, and it soon became evident that the enemy almost considered the task they had undertaken a hopeless one. Notwithstanding the continued rebuff of the rebels wherever they had made their assaults, up to two o'clock they had given no evidence of retiring from the field. Their firing had been as rapid and vigorous at times as during the most terrible hours of the previous day, yet not so well confined to one point of attack."

Hurlbut's forces, 2d and 3d brigades, were also doing great service in another part of the field, on the left, where, by their undaunted bravery, they contributed to the complete success of the day. Hurlbut, in his report, thus chronicled the doings of his brigades:—"The 2d brigade led the charge ordered by General Grant until recalled by Major-General Buell. The 3d brigade was deeply and fiercely engaged on the right of General McClernand, successfully stopping a movement to flank his right, and holding their ground until the firing ceased. About one o'clock of that day, (Monday,) General McCook having closed up with General McClernand, and the enemy demonstrating in great force on the left, I went, by the request of General McClernand, to the rear of his line to bring up fresh troops, and was engaged in pressing them forward until the steady advance of General Buell on the extreme left, the firmness of the center, and the closing in from the right of Generals Sherman and Wallace determined the success of the day, when I called in my exhausted brigades, and led them to their camps. The ground was such on Sunday that I was unable to use cavalry. Colonel Taylor's

5th Ohio cavalry was drawn up in order of battle until near one o'clock, in the hope that some opening might offer for the use of this arm. None appearing, I ordered the command withdrawn from the reach of shot."

We left Wallace at halt, after having forced the enemy back on the extreme Federal right. Then he determined to push his column obliquely forward to the center. Seeing this, the watchful foe threw his cavalry on to the temporarily exposed right flank; but the 23d Indiana and one company of the 1st Nebraska regiment threw the squadron into confusion by their cutting fire. Wallace said:—"Scarcely had my front movement commenced, when the supports on the left gave way, closely followed by masses of the enemy. My position at this time became critical, as isolation from the rest of the army seemed imminent. The reserves were resorted to. Colonel Woods, with his regiment, was ordered into line on the left. The remnant of a Michigan regiment, sent me by General McClernand, was dispatched to the left of Woods'. Thurber galloped up, and was posted to cover a retreat, should such a misfortune become necessary. Before the dispositions could be effected, the 11th Indiana, already engaged with superior numbers in its front, was attacked on its left flank; but backward wheeling three companies of his endangered wing, Colonel McGinnis gallantly held his ground. Fortunately, before the enemy could avail themselves of their advantage by the necessary change of front, some fresh troops dashed against them, and once more drove them back. For this favor my acknowledgments are especially due Colonel August Willich and his famous regiment."

The gallant General chronicled the closing scenes of the afternoon in the following fine strain:—

"Pending this struggle, Colonel Thayer pushed on his command and entered the woods, assaulting the rebels simultaneously with Colonel Smith. Here the 58th Ohio and 23d Indiana proved themselves fit comrades in battle with the noble 1st Nebraska. Here, also, the 76th Ohio won a brilliant fame. The 1st Nebraska fired away its last cartridge in the heat of the action. At a word, the 76th Ohio rushed in and took its place. Off to the right, meanwhile, arose the music of the 20th and 78th Ohio, fighting gallantly in support

of Thurber, to whom the sound of rebel cannon seemed a challenge no sooner heard than accepted.

"From the time the wood was entered, forward was the only order. And step by step, from tree to tree, position to position, the rebel lines went back, never stopping again—infantry, horse and artillery, all went back. The firing was grand and terrible. Before us was the Crescent regiment of New Orleans; shelling us on the right was the Washington Artillery, of Manassas renown, whose last stand was in front of Colonel Whittlesey's command. To and fro, now in my front, then in Sherman's, rode General Beauregard, inciting his troops, and fighting for his fading *prestige* of invincibility. The desperation of the struggle may be easily imagined.

"While this was in progress, far along the lines to the left the contest was raging with equal obstinacy. As indicated by the sounds, however, the enemy seemed retiring everywhere. Cheer after cheer rung through the woods. Each man felt the day was ours.

"About four o'clock, the enemy to my front broke into rout, and ran through the camps occupied by General Sherman on Sunday morning. Their own camp had been established about two miles beyond. There, without halting, they fired tents, stores, etc. Throwing out the wounded, they filled their wagons full of arms, (Springfield muskets and Enfield rifles,) ingloriously thrown away by some of our troops the day before, and hurried on. After following them until nearly nightfall, I brought my division back to Owl Creek, and bivouacked it."

Buell, with Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions, pressed into the enemy's right as obstinately as Wallace had pressed their extreme left. Buell thus briefly states the important services of his command:

"Ammen's brigade, which was on the left, advanced in good order upon the enemy's right, but was checked for some time by his endeavor to turn our left flank, and by his strong center attack in front. Captain Terrell, who, in the mean time, had taken an advanced position, was compelled to retire, leaving one caisson, of which every horse was killed or disabled. It was very soon recovered. Having been reinforced by a regiment from General Boyle's brigade, Nelson's division again moved

forward, and forced the enemy to abandon entirely his position. This success flanked the enemy at his second and third batteries, from which he was soon driven, with the loss of several pieces of artillery by the concentrated fire of Terrell's and Mendenhall's batteries, and an attack from Crittenden's division in front. The enemy made a second stand some eight hundred yards in rear of this position, and opened fire with his artillery. Mendenhall's battery was thrown forward, silenced the battery, and it was captured by Crittenden's division, the enemy retreating from it. In the mean time, the division of General McCook on the right, which became engaged somewhat later in the morning than the divisions on the left, had made steady progress, until it drove the enemy's left from the hotly-contested field. The action was commenced in this division by General Rosseau's brigade, which drove the enemy in front of it from his first position, and captured a battery. The line of attack of this division caused a considerable widening of the space between it and Crittenden's right. It was also outflanked on its right by the line of the enemy, who made repeated strong attacks on its flanks, but was always gallantly repulsed. The enemy made his last decided stand in front of this division, in the woods beyond Sherman's camp."

Nelson speaks of his commanders with pride and satisfaction, as well he might. The steadiness of his troops contributed materially to the good fortune of the day.

The services of McCook's superb brigade already have been adverted to in the quotations we have given from Sherman's report. But, to do the division more ample justice, we quote from McCook's report:

"The enemy's attack on the right and center was continuous and severe, but the steady valor of General Rosseau's brigade repulsed him. He was vigorously pursued for the distance of a mile, when he received large reinforcements, and rallied among the tents of a portion of General McClernand's division, from which it had been driven on the 6th inst. Here, supported by two pieces of artillery which were lost the day before, the enemy made a desperate stand. At this juncture, Colonel Buckley, 5th Kentucky regiment, charged and captured the two guns in position, with four more of the

same battery partially disabled, which the enemy could not carry off. Here General Rosseau had the pleasure of retaking General McClernand's head-quarters. The enemy fell back over an open field and re-formed on the skirt of the woods beyond. General Rosseau's brigade then advanced into the open field to engage him. The advance of my division had created a space between it and General Crittenden's, and the enemy began mustering troops to take advantage of this gap in our lines, made unavoidable by the attempt of the enemy to turn my right flank and his subsequent retreat. I immediately ordered Colonel Willich to advance to the support of General Rosseau's left, and to give the enemy the bayonet as soon as possible. His regiment filed through the line of Colonel Kirk's brigade, which had been withdrawn from the right when the danger menacing that flank had passed, and advanced into a most withering fire of shell, canister and musketry, which for a moment staggered it; but it was soon rallied, and for an account of the numerous conflicts and desperate charges this regiment made, I refer you to Colonel Willich's report, transmitted herewith. Being now satisfied that the enemy had changed his point of attack from the right to my extreme left, I ordered Colonel Stambaugh's 77th Pennsylvania to take up a position on my extreme left, and repel the assault there being made. He immediately engaged them, and at this moment the contest along the whole line became terrible. Colonel Kirk's brigade was now ordered to engage, and he arrived precisely at the right moment, as the cartridges of General Rosseau's brigade were all expended. General Rosseau's brigade fell back through openings made in Colonel Kirk's ranks, and retired to the woods in the rear to be supplied. Three hours before, being convinced from the stubbornness with which the enemy was contending, and the rapid discharges of my regiments, that their forty rounds of cartridges would soon be exhausted, I dispatched Lieutenant Campbell, my ordnance officer, for teams to bring up ammunition. He arrived at the opportune moment with the three wagon-loads. While General Rosseau's brigade was being supplied with ammunition, I ordered Colonel Kirk's where the enemy was still endeavoring to force his way. At this moment every available man was ordered to fire, and the

enemy seemed to increase in the vigor and the rapidity of his attack. Now the firing for a few moments became terrific. The enemy, to retake the ground and battery lost, advanced with a force of at least ten thousand men against my two brigades, and when he deployed in line of battle, the volleys from the contending ranks were two continuous sheets of fire. Here Major Levenway, commanding the 34th Illinois, was killed by a shell, and the regiment wavered for a moment, when Colonel Kirk, Colonel of the regiment but commanding the 5th brigade, seized a flag, rushed forward, and steadied the line. While doing so, he was severely wounded in the shoulder. The enemy now began to turn the left of Colonel Gibson's brigade, when the 49th Ohio, by this disposition of the enemy, was compelled to change its front twice under a heavy fire. I am proud to say that this hazardous maneuver was performed with apparently as much steadiness as on parade.

"As soon as General Rosseau's brigade received its ammunition, it was again ordered into line, and I directed into action two regiments belonging to General Hurlbut's division, which had been lying in reserve on my left since morning.

"When these dispositions were made, I ordered an advance of my whole command, which was made in gallant style. The enemy did not withstand the charge, but fled, leaving all of their wounded, and were pursued by my division beyond General Sherman's head-quarters of the day before, when the pursuit was taken up by the cavalry and artillery."

Beauregard was everywhere along his lines throughout that memorable day, striving by appeal, command, exposure of his own person, to arrest the tide of defeat; but to no purpose. The steady flank advances of the Federal wings—the solidity of their center, rendered it necessary to "retire," if he would not be cut off entirely from retreat. His baffled and somewhat dispirited brigades fell back slowly, gathering, in good order, in upon the Corinth road, which, in all the fortunes of the two day's fight, had been carefully secured from any approach of the Unionists. The retreat has been described as a rout, but such it was not to any great degree. Some regiments threw away their arms, blankets, etc., from

exhaustion, and a reckless disregard of orders; while the great numbers of killed, wounded and exhausted so absorbed even the transport wagons as to compel the enemy to leave behind much of his camp equipage and some of his guns.

The pursuit was feeble. The nature of the woods restrained the cavalry in their movements and rendered them comparatively useless. Three thousand finely mounted fellows had waited, for two days, an opportunity to ride into the conflict; and the order, late in the day of Monday, to pursue and harass the enemy, gave them but a brief service. The infantry pushed forward only for a mile or two. Colonel Wagner's brigade of General Wood's division arrived late in the day, and was given the order to advance to the front for the pursuit; but Buell knew so little of the topography of the country that he considered it hazardous to penetrate too far into the enemy's midst. This neglect to press the retreating foe gave them the poor consolation of pronouncing their effort to stay the Federal advance a success, and thereupon a victory. The press of the South quite generally heralded it as a great triumph for the Confederates!* They needed some crumb of comfort to console them for the loss of Island No. 10, which General Pope's masterly strategy and Commodore Foote's "irrepressible" guns gave to the Federal arms with all its garrison, armaments, stores, etc., on the morning of the 8th of April.

AFTER THE BATTLE.

"A visit to the field," wrote a correspondent from the scene of the two days' tragedy, "immediately after the retreat of the rebels and the pursuit of our forces, exhibited a spectacle

* Beauregard's dispatch announcing to his Government the tidings of the second day's battle read:

"We have gained a great and glorious victory. Eight to ten thousand prisoners and thirty-six pieces of cannon. Buell reinforced Grant and we retired to our intrenchments at Corinth, which we can hold. Loss heavy on both sides."

No matter if the "eight to ten thousand prisoners" actually was about one-third of that number—no matter if his own losses in prisoners was considerable—no matter if his losses of artillery *exceeded* the number given as captured by him;—these facts were only for "private circulation"—those given in the dispatch were for the public. His dispatch of April 9th—captured at Huntsville by General Mitchell—piteously calling for reinforcements, proves how wretchedly he falsified for the public ear when he confidently said he could hold Corinth.

seldom to be witnessed and most horrible to contemplate. The first approaches, occupying the further range of the enemy's guns, showed at the first glance the work of devastation made by those ball and shell which had overshot the mark. Large trees were entirely cut off within ten feet from the ground, heavy limbs lay strewn in every direction, and pieces of exploded missiles were scattered all around. The carcasses of dead horses and the wrecks of wagons strewed all the woods, and other evidences of similar character marked every step of the way.

"Half a mile further on, and the more important feature of the struggle was brought to view. Dead bodies in the woods, the dead and dying in the fields, lying in every conceivable shape, met the gaze on either hand. Some lay on their back, with their clenched hands raised at arm's length, upright in the air. Others had fallen with their guns fast in their grasp, as if they were in the act of loading them when the fatal shaft struck them dead. Others still had received the winged messenger of death, and with their remaining strength had crawled away from further danger, and, sheltering themselves behind old logs, had lain down to die. Here were the bodies of those who had fallen yesterday, and mingled with them were those from whose wounds the blood was yet trickling away. The scene beggars all description, and I do not wish to attempt to depict its horrors. The fatality on the open space I have referred to as the "Battalion Drill Ground," was the greatest which came under my observation.

"The canister which had swept it over in the morning had been terrible in its results. Strongly contested as its possession had been by both sides, yet the dead were as five to one on the side of the rebels. One man here was in a bent position, resting on his hands and feet, with his face downward, yet cold and rigid as marble. One had crawled away to the border of the woods, and ensconcing himself between two logs, had spread his blanket above him to shield him, perhaps, from the rain of the previous night. He was a wounded rebel, and he pitifully asked 'if we could do any thing for him?' At his feet lay the body of one of those Union boys I have spoken of as having had his hair burned from his head. On interrogating the rebel as to the cause of his being in such a

condition, his only reply was, 'I do not know, I did not do it.' We assured him that an ambulance would soon be at hand, to take him to better quarters, and left him.

"The larger guns had done some strange work. One case I saw where the entire lower portion of a man's foot had been carried away, leaving two toes and the upper portion remaining. Another had been struck by a bullet on the forehead, and the missile had followed the curve of the head entirely around to the termination of the hair on the back portion of his cranium. The case of the celebrated Kansas scout, Carson (not Kit,) was horrifying. His face and the entire lower portion of his head were entirely gone, his brain dabbling into the little pool of blood which had gathered in the cavity below. I could fill pages with such cases, but it is useless to particularize. Suffice it to say that the slaughter is immense."

Captain Jackson, of General Grant's staff, said: "The field of battle presented a sorry spectacle. It extended over a distance of five miles in length and three-quarters of a mile in width. This space was fought over twice in regular battle array, and many times in the fluctuating fortunes of the different portions of the two armies. It was covered with dead and wounded. Where the artillery had taken effect, men lay in heaps, covering rods of ground, mingled in wild masses of mangled horses, broken gun-carriages and all the dread *débris* of a battle-field. Where our men had made their desperate charges, the bodies lay in rows as they had received the bayonet, constituting, at particular points, parapets of flesh and blood, over which a battle might have been fought as over a breast-work. Not a tree or a sapling in that whole space which was not pierced through and through with cannon-shot and musket-balls, and, if we may believe the accounts, there was scarcely a rod of ground on the five miles which did not have a dead or wounded man upon it."

THE REGIMENTS AND ARTILLERY ENGAGED.

The report of losses hereafter given will tell the sad story for the various brigades and divisions; the reports of brigade commanders give the regiments and battalions, as such, prominent mention; but, who shall tell the deeds of individual members of regiments and batteries? The victory was only

won by the heroic fortitude of men, many of whom never before had been under fire; and the field is written all over with the record of those whose unfaltering heroism gave the name of Pittsburg Landing to the hardest fought and noblest won battle of the American continent. May their names and deeds be brought to the light, that their country shall do them due honor!

The several correspondents present during the conflict added their testimony to the valor of particular regiments, and also recorded many instances of personal devotion. Some of these we may affix to our record, to strengthen the proofs, which now so plentifully exist, that Northern men are among the very best soldiers—in the widest acceptation of the word—who ever stood upon a modern field of battle. What country ever before created such an army out of six hundred thousand citizens—many of whom were unacquainted with even the simplest principles of military science? What war is so *alive* in its history, with deeds of honor and glory?

From the several letters written on the field the day after the battle, we quote: "When the 11th Illinois were mustered on Monday morning, they could bring but forty-five men into the field. The 9th Illinois, Paine's old regiment, mustered only two hundred effective men. Colonel Frye's regiment were the only Illinois boys that acted badly."

"The Illinois men, already famous at Donelson, fought like devils to sustain their well-earned reputation. The same may be said of Missouri, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, and some of the Iowa regiments."

"The 1st and 2d Kentucky, in the fight, were the men for the position they occupied. They, as well as the 6th, were under a galling fire for not less than five hours, yet when the enemy thought proper to turn their faces toward the 'most sacred soil of Mississippi,' they were ready and eager to follow, which they did with great alacrity."

"The Ohio 54th Zouave regiment were at their post in the thickest of the fight. Also the 57th, and remembered that Ohio wished all her sons to do their duty."

"Taylor's and Waterhouse's batteries, supported by the 23d Illinois, 77th and 53d Ohio regiments, were first in the fight. Both the Ohio regiments ran—the 77th without firing a gun,

leaving Waterhouse without any support. He fought for half an hour, however, retiring with three guns. He was wounded in the thigh by a Minié ball. His battery is badly cut up. Taylor's battery continued to fight, supported splendidly by the Illinois regiment, until he and his support were outflanked, on both sides. He then retired through a cross-fire, having one man killed and seventeen wounded."

"Waterhouse, with his three guns, took up a second position supported by the 2d brigade of McClernand's division, composed of the 11th, 17th, 20th, 45th and 48th Illinois, Colonel Marsh commanding. During the forenoon they were compelled to retire through their own encampment, with heavy loss, into the woods. There a second line of battle was formed, when McClernand ordered an advance. A hundred rods brought the solid columns within sight of the rebels, and then followed one of the most fiercely-contested and sanguinary engagements of that desperate field. It resulted in the repulse of the rebels, who were driven back through our encampments. Then the enemy was reinforced, and Colonel Marsh, finding his ammunition about expended, gave his position to another brigade. It, however, was soon compelled to retreat before the overwhelming forces of the enemy.

"At this moment the gunboats opened fire, throwing the shells over our heads, and covered the ground in every direction with the rebel slain. Taylor's battery again took a position on the parade ground of the 1st division, and opened on the rebel battery eight hundred yards distant. A splendid artillery duel took place. The rebel battery was silenced, and their caisson blown up. Taylor's battery was then ordered into a reserve.

"On Monday a fine Michigan battery, captured by the enemy the day before, was retaken by the 16th Wisconsin, at the point of the bayonet. The fight, after taking this battery, was conducted by General Beauregard in person. In his efforts to recover it he was wounded in the arm. He was successful in taking it, but it was again taken from him. It was retaken and recaptured no less than six times.

"Company A of the Chicago Light Artillery, who were so severely handled on the first day, were only able to man three guns on Monday; but with these, after a desperate contest,

they succeeded completely in silencing and capturing a rebel battery of six guns. They were, however, compelled to abandon it from want of horses; their own pieces were brought off by hand."

The report of General Lew Wallace especially commended the Nebraska 1st, the 20th, 58th, 76th and 78th Ohio, and the 23d Indiana. The Indiana 25th literally "covered itself with glory." The Indiana 6th, 9th, 11th, 31st, 32d, 24th, 43d and 57th all performed most honorable parts in the terrible drama.

Of the United States regulars, there was a fine representation. They were used at those points where the utmost steadiness was demanded, and fought with the consummate skill and perfect coolness which preëminently distinguishes our regular service.

The losses of the Illinois regiments in McClelland's division were very heavy, in officers and men. Several of the regiments, indeed, mustered less than half their numbers after the fight. The following is the tabular report of losses in that division:

REGIMENTS.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.	
	Command. Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Command. Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Enlisted Men.	TOTAL.
1st BRIGADE—8th Illinois,	1	22	7	84	3	177
18th Illinois,	1	10	6	57	3	77
11th Iowa,	1	28	8	139	1	177
13th Iowa;	2	23	9	130	11	175
2d BRIGADE—11th Illinois,	1	13	6	65	13	97
20th Illinois,	1	21	6	98	10	136
45th Illinois,	3	22	10	162	—	197
48th Illinois,	1	16	5	84	23	129
3d BRIGADE—17th Illinois,	—	14	5	111	9	139
29th Illinois,	3	14	1	71	17	106
43d Illinois,	6	39	9	122	146	312
49th Illinois,	1	10	6	98	—	115
ARTILLERY—14th Ohio Battery,	—	4	—	23	—	29
McAllister's,	—	—	1	11	—	11
Dresser's,	—	4	1	20	—	26
Schwartz's,	—	1	—	4	—	5
CAVALRY—Stewart's,	—	—	1	1	—	2

And as an evidence of the stubborn courage of these men, we may give the story of the Illinois 11th, as related by Captain Waddell, of Company E, in a letter to his father. He wrote:

"It was nearly half a mile from our encampment to the position where the enemy had attacked us. The order for 'double quick' was given, and we were soon on the field of action. We had not to wait long, for soon in front of us was seen—not three hundred yards distant—the enemy, five regiments deep, advancing steadily. It was a glorious but a terrible sight. The order was, 'The whites of their eyes, boys, and then give it to them,' and the 11th was again engaged. Never, *never* in my life have I seen, or in the annals of history have I read of such a death-struggle.

"Our men fought well at Donelson, but never did they fight as they fought on the 6th of April. The enemy were repulsed; they stood for a moment seemingly thunderstruck, and then broke their ranks and started to fly. The officers rallied them, and then, under a most galling fire, commenced retrieving their lost ground. Our regiment being badly cut up—Colonel Ransom shot in the head, (not mortally,) Captain Carter dead, Captain Coats mortally wounded, five or six of our Lieutenants down, and no reserve coming to our assistance—the order was given to fall back. We gradually, but obstinately, fell back. We were soon cheered by the assistance of several regiments coming up, who filed in our front, and we were for a time relieved. We fell back—and what a sight! Not one hundred men remained in the 11th! It was an awful sight to look at that little band, besmeared with blood and dirt, with their trusty guns in their hands, looking along the line to see how many of their beloved companions were left to them. It was a sight I never wish to see again. But, there was little time to lose, and no time to complain. The General came up, and asked if that was all that was left of the 11th. 'Yes,' was the reply. 'Well, my men,' he said, 'we must win this day, or *all* will be lost. Will you try it again?' 'We will, General,' was the response. The boys called on *me* to lead them. I formed the regiment (or company, as it was) on the left of the 70th Ohio regiment, and was again ordered to take our position in front. Ten minutes' time and we are again engaged."

INCIDENTS.

The two days' battle was characterized by so many peculiar circumstances that quite a volume might be made up in relating the stories of regiments, of companies, and of their men. Of deeds of valor worthy of Roman renown and of cowardice unworthy of men—of endurance, patience, suffering, which tested the powers of the physical system in a most extraordinary degree—of self-sacrifice and devotion—of enthusiasm and faith in the final triumph—enough could be said to make the battle of Pittsburg Landing memorable in the annals of the memorable war. We are only permitted to recur to a few of such as seem well calculated to add interest to the narrative here given of the prolonged struggle.

One who visited the scene of action for observation, a few days after the "bloody Sunday," thus referred to some of the incidents of the field:

"On Sunday, especially, several portions of the ground were fought over three and four times, and the two lines swayed backward and forward like advancing and retreating waves. In repeated instances, rebel and Union soldiers, protected by the trees, were within thirty feet of each other. The rebels derisively shouted 'Bull Run,' and our men returned the taunt by crying 'Donelson.' Many of the camps, as they were lost and won, lost again, and retaken, received showers of balls. At the close of the fight, General McClelland's tent contained twenty-seven bullet-holes, and his Adjutant's thirty-two. Chairs, tables, mess-pans, camp-kettles and other articles of camp furniture were riddled. In the Adjutant's tent, when our forces recaptured it, the body of a rebel was found in a sitting position. He had evidently stopped for a moment's rest, when a ball struck and killed him. In one tree I have counted sixty bullet-holes. Another tree, not more than eighteen inches in diameter, which was in front of General Lew Wallace's division, bears the mark of more than ninety balls within ten feet of the ground. On Sunday, Company A, of the 49th Illinois, lost from one volley twenty-nine men, including three officers; and on Monday morning the company appeared on the ground commanded by a Second Sergeant. General McClelland's 3d Brigade, which

was led by Colonel Raith until he was mortally wounded, changed commanders three times during the battle. On Monday morning, one of General Hurlbut's regiments (the 3d Iowa) was commanded by a First Lieutenant, and others were in command of Captains."

Such statements would be discredited were they not confirmed by those of other writers who have visited the field. They serve to prove how appalling must have been the slaughter, and yet out of the awful picture how the one great fact stands forth in a halo of glory—that of the courage of the Northern men! Such courage has in it elements of sublimity which would immortalize any other people. But of Americans *it is expected*, and, therefore, will not especially be noted by writers on the War. The correspondent above referred to says of the personal bearing and hair-breadth escapes of some of the commanders:

"General Grant is an illustration of the fortune through which some men, in the thickest showers of bullets, always escape. He has participated in two skirmishes and fourteen pitched battles, and is universally pronounced, by those who have seen him on the field, daring even to rashness; but he has never received a scratch. At four o'clock on Sunday evening, he was sitting upon his horse, just in the rear of our line of batteries, when Captain Carson, the scout who had reported to him a moment before, had fallen back, and was holding his horse by the bridle, about seven feet behind him. A six-pound shot, which flew very near General Grant, carried away all Carson's head, except a portion of the chin, passed just behind Lieutenant Graves, volunteer aid to General Wilson, tearing away the cantle of his saddle, cutting his clothing but not injuring him, and then took off the legs of a soldier in one of General Nelson's regiments, which were just ascending the bluff.

"About the same hour, further up to the right, General Sherman, who had been standing for a moment, while Major Hammond, his chief of staff, was holding his bridle, remounted. By the prancing of his horse, as he mounted, General Sherman's reins were thrown over his neck, and he was leaning forward in the saddle, with his head lowered, while Major Hammond was bringing them back over his head,

when a rifle-ball struck the line in Major Hammond's hand, severing it, within two inches of his fingers, and passing through the top and back of General Sherman's hat. Had he been sitting upright it would have struck his head. At another time a ball struck General Sherman on the shoulder, but his metallic shoulder-strap warded it off. With a third he was less fortunate, for it passed through his hand; but now he has nearly recovered from the wound. General Sherman had three horses shot under him, two with three balls each, and the last with two. It is the universal testimony that he maneuvered his troops admirably, and that he is the hero of the battle. His nomination to a Major-Generalship is a deserved tribute to one of the best officers in our service.

"General Hurlbut had a six-pound shot pass between his horse's head and his arm; a bullet passed through his horse's mane, and one of his horses was killed under him. Lieutenants Dorchester and Long, of his staff, each had several bullets and pieces of shell strike their clothing. Lieutenant Tesilian, of General McClelland's staff, had his clothing perforated by five balls, without receiving a wound. Major Hammond, of General Sherman's staff, had his cap cut by two bullets, and his boots by two, and two horses shot under him, but he escaped uninjured. A private in the 17th Illinois had two of his front teeth knocked out by a bullet, which, though it entered his mouth, did him no further injury. A rifle-ball struck the temple of another private near his right ear, passed through his head and came out near the left ear; but he is recovering. Lieutenant Charles Provost, of the 1st Nebraska, received a bullet in the clasp of his sword-belt, and was afterward knocked down by the windage of a cannon-ball, but was not injured."

The statement has gone forth that General Prentiss was made prisoner at the first early onslaught of the enemy, when his division was driven in upon Sherman's lines. But, this is an error deserving of correction. Prentiss' men fought well even in retiring, while his tried regiments were every thing which their gallant commander could require. They retired to re-form, and came into the conflict to fight up to late in the afternoon under Prentiss' personal lead. They maintained

a stand on McClelland's left and Hurlbut's right. A writer from the field said:—"In the thick underbrush where they made their last stand, almost every shrub and bush, though no larger than one's finger, has been struck by bullets; and I have seen no spot on the entire field which evidences more desperate fighting. The last time General Prentiss met General Hurlbut, he asked him: 'Can you hold your line?' General Hurlbut replied, 'I think I can.' Not long after he sent a messenger to General Prentiss, to inform him that he was forced back, but the messenger was probably killed, as he has never returned. About the same time, General McClelland was forced back on his right, and Prentiss, without knowing that his supports on each side were gone, held his line. The enemy both on his right and left, was half a mile in his rear before he discovered it, and his capture was inevitable." This is confirmed by Hurlbut's report, already quoted in these pages.

One of General Buell's maneuvers, characteristic of his off-hand and reliable way of meeting exigencies, is happily illustrated in the following:

"The rebels were advancing in great force to turn our left and capture our transports and supplies, when Buell, becoming aware of their intentions, made preparations to receive them. About half a mile above the Landing are two large ridges running back from the river. The ridge next to the Landing is the highest. Buell placed a battery on each of the ridges, and between them he placed a brigade of infantry. The troops were ordered to lie down. He then ordered the lower battery to fire on the enemy and make a show of retreating in confusion, so to draw the rebels on. On came the rebels pell-mell, yelling at the top of their voices, 'Bull Run!' 'Bull Run!' thinking to frighten us. As soon as the rebels came in range, the lower battery, agreeably to orders, opened fire, retreated, and took a position in the rear of the upper battery. The rebels, seeing our men retreating, charged up the hill and took possession of the battery. The rebels, in the mean time, were not aware of our troops being in the hollow below them. At this moment the signal was sounded, and the whole brigade rose to their feet and poured a deadly fire of rifle-balls into the ranks of the rebels, cutting

them down by scores. At this favorable moment, also, the upper battery poured in a perfect storm of grape and canister shot. The rebels reeled and staggered like drunken men, and at last broke and fled in every direction, leaving the ground strewn with dead and dying."

Of the General's conduct in battle, one of his men wrote : "I wish you could have seen the gallantry, the bravery, the dauntless daring, the coolness of General Buell. He seemed to be omnipresent. If ever man was qualified to command an army it is he. He is a great, a *very* great General, and has proved himself so ; not only in organizing and disciplining an army, but in handling it. General Buell had his horse shot under him. Captain Wright, his Aid, had the visor of his cap touched by a ball."

LOSSES.

The official reports of losses were made up with exceeding slowness, owing to the wide extent of the battle-field, the large proportion of scattered and disorganized men, the difficulty of obtaining hospital returns, and to the defective hospital arrangements, which compelled the immediate shipment of great numbers of wounded to Cairo and other points where proper care could be given them. The tabular statement as finally produced was :

GRANT'S ARMY.

DIVISIONS.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.	TOTAL.
1—General McClelland,	251	1,351	236	1,848
2—General W. H. L. Wallace,	228	1,033	1,163	2,424
3—General Lew Wallace,	43	257	5	305
4—General Hurlbut,	313	1,449	223	1,985
5—General Sherman,	318	1,275	441	2,034
6—General Prentiss,	196	562	1,802	2,760
Total,	1,349	5,927	3,870	11,356

BUELL'S ARMY.

2—General McCook,	95	793	8	896
4—General Nelson,	90	591	58	739
5—General Crittenden,	80	410	27	517
Total,	265	1,794	93	2,152
Grand Total,	1,614	7,721	3,963	13,508

As to the enemy's loss, no authentic data are available. It is stated that after Monday's fight, General McClelland's division buried the remains of six hundred and thirty-eight rebels left upon the field, General Sherman's six hundred, General Nelson's two hundred and sixty-three, and Colonel Thayer's brigade of General Lew Wallace's division, one hundred and twenty-three. These were the only commands from which returns were received; but the most of the other divisions and brigades buried a proportionate number. The rebels must have lost four thousand killed, by the most moderate estimate. After the battle, Captain Russell, of the 6th Ohio, counted the bodies of one hundred and twenty-six rebels, lying where they fell, upon a strip of land less than one-fourth of a mile long, and fifty yards in width. Eleven of them, in front, had fallen nearly in line, about five paces apart, and were evidently skirmishers. Colonel Thayer, of the 1st Nebraska, in another portion of the field, opposite General Sherman's division, counted thirty-seven dead rebels, side by side, who had evidently been killed while in line of battle, by a single volley. Sixty-eight were counted in front of the ground held by the 48th Ohio, and eighty-five in front of the 72d Ohio. A detail of men from General McCook's division buried in a single trench one hundred and forty-seven, including three Lieutenant-Colonels and four Majors. A tabular statement published in the *Memphis Argus*, April 24th, confessed to nine hundred and twenty-seven killed, four thousand four hundred and seventy-one wounded and three hundred and sixty-one missing. As this statement was but fragmentary, and "daily additions were being made to the list," it was only valuable for showing what regiments were in the engagement. They were (so far as named): 154th Tennessee! 15th Tennessee; Blythe's "Mississippi;" Breckenridge's brigade; 11th, 1st, 13th, and 4th Louisiana; 2d, 4th, 47th, 6th, 1st, 22d, 13th, 5th, 20th, 19th, 28th, 45th and 33d Tennessee; 20th, 22d, 25th and 16th Alabama; 1st and 13th Arkansas; 7th Kentucky; 15th and 22d Mississippi; 1st Missouri; Polk's, Bank's and Stamford's batteries; Forrest's Cavalry, etc., etc. Several companies of Texan rangers were also engaged in the fight.

Bearing on the enemy's losses we may cite the dispatch of Beauregard to Adjutant-General Cooper, of the Confederate

army establishment. That dispatch was intercepted by General Mitchell in his rapid and unexpected descent on Huntsville, Alabama, where the telegraph office was seized. In its freshly-booked business file was found the following :

“CORINTH, April 9.

“*To General Samuel Cooper, Richmond, Va.:*

“All present probabilities are that whenever the enemy moves on this position he will do so with an overwhelming force of not less than vrzole xriy lohknaj men, by wna ahe vkjlyi hate nqhl lorite xmy lohknaj yx31 wlrnqj mna phia may possibly shrakj ran xyc pnejerlo nghkl xrlly 5a lohknaj vhmj. Can we not be reinforced xrhv dyvgzilhaj nive. If defeated here cy thjy lov vrjq mnt3yc nap dehqn4te hki wnkjy whereas we could even afford to lose for a while wonilyjlha nap inmzu5yl for the purpose of defeating qkyl4j nive, which would not only insure us the valley of the Mississippi, but our independence.

P. G. T. BEAUREGARD.”

The “astronomer General” was not long in deciphering this. He had studied the laws of refraction and reflection too long to be baffled by this *divertissement*. Here is the translation :

“CORINTH, April 9.

“*To General Samuel Cooper, Richmond, Va.:*

“All present probabilities are that whenever the enemy moves on this position he will do so with an overwhelming force of not less than eighty-five thousand men. We can now muster only about thirty-five thousand effective (men.) Van Dorn may possibly join us in a few days with fifteen thousand more. Can we not be reinforced from Pemberton’s army? If defeated here we lose the Mississippi valley, and probably our cause; whereas we could even afford to lose for a while Charleston and Savannah, for the purpose of defeating Buell’s army, which would not only insure us the valley of the Mississippi but our independence.

P. G. T. BEAUREGARD.”

This tells a woeful story of losses, for it is certain that, in the attack of Sunday, forty-five thousand men were engaged; while in that of Monday, at least seventy-five thousand men were brought into the field. The General doubtless considered a large portion of his command *non-effective* from exhaustion, demoralization, desertion, and sickness. The

killed and wounded, it has been ascertained, *exceeded*, by one-third, the Federal loss.

MITCHELL'S DOINGS.

We should have adverted to the performances of General Mitchell, whose rapid strokes to the south of Nashville, cutting off Beauregard's connections with the East, had been so effectual as to send consternation into the rebel heart. Such a campaign as that executed by the astronomer had never been deemed probable; yet there he was at Huntsville, Alabama, April 9th, to intercept the rebel commander's reinforcements, for which his pitiful appeal had been made.

Mitchell left Nashville with his division at the date of Buell's departure. Buell pushed across the country toward Pittsburg, going by way of Columbia. The astronomer struck directly for Murfreesboro. From thence his strokes were so rapid that he was in Huntsville before the country was aware of the purpose of the movement. After Huntsville, Decatur and Florence fell, thus closing the East to the enemy, and compelling him to draw all supplies and reinforcements from the South and West.

The capitulation of Island No. 10—on the morning of the "bloody Sunday"—gave our forces the vantage ground on the Mississippi, and left General Pope's splendid brigades available for use on the field around Corinth, whither he was soon called. Being assigned the extreme left of Halleck's army, he closed the avenue of descent upon Mitchell, by detachments from Beauregard's army—leaving the Federal General to punish the enemy wherever he could be found—a pleasure not often afforded, since, in almost all instances, the rebels fled before the astronomer's unconquerable and tireless legion.

DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES.

The General having pressed down upon the Tennessee had necessarily greatly scattered his not very extensive forces in descents upon Decatur, Florence, Tuscumbia, while the General held Huntsville as a *point d'appui*. Before the forces investing Corinth were so disposed as to employ all the enemy's attention,

Mitchell stood in danger of a visitation from a section of Beauregard's army. It was, therefore, necessary to withdraw his brigades from Tuscumbia and Decatur, for a while. Generals Turchin and Lythe, in occupancy of these positions, burned the bridge at Decatur, and then fell back upon Huntsville, while General Mitchell was building a bridge at a point beyond Stevenson. A correspondent wrote of the positions:

"While these two Generals were engaged in destroying the bridge at Decatur, Generals Mitchell and Siel were engaged in building another at a point beyond Stevenson—the division commander having determined to contract his lines and hold the positions gained north of the Tennessee more strongly. It must be understood that General Mitchell did not hold the whole of this part of the railroad north of the river. His left was at Stevenson, or rather a few miles east of it, but the rebel right was north of the Tennessee, and advanced to the very left of General Mitchell. They thus had the bridge at this point by which to cross the river, and were only separated from us by a stream three hundred feet wide, and which is fordable in half a dozen places near the scene of action. In contracting his line by drawing in his right he appears to have purposed extending his left, and placing the river between himself and his foes at Chattanooga.

"General Mitchell was aware of the movements from Chattanooga to Bridgeport, and the work of intrenching going on at both places. The enemy's force consisted of two regiments of cavalry, amounting to one thousand six hundred men, five regiments of infantry, and a battery of light rifled pieces. These had advanced to the west end of the bridge at this point, ten miles from Stevenson, and had thrown up a long rifle pit, at the right of which was an unfinished fort. This position defended the approach to the bridge which spans the Tennessee. These works were on the crest of a hill which ran at right angles with the bridge, and which the railroad passed with a slight cut."

THE STRATEGY OF THE FLANK MOVEMENT.

Of the movements which resulted in the capture of Bridgeport and disordered retreat of the enemy we are thus informed by one who was present:

"The left of General Mitchell, previous to his movement on Bridgeport, was at Stevenson.

"On Sunday morning (April 21st) the brigade was engaged in building the bridge which two weeks before they had destroyed. At the same time and day another brigade was engaged in burning the one at Decatur. It can not be denied that General Mitchell is a Protean commander, as he appears at one and the same time at different places, one hundred miles apart, building and burning, contracting and expanding, retreating and attacking, and he, more than all this, builds bridges as rapidly as he burns them. He occupied Sunday in destroying the Decatur bridge. He took only the same time and the same day to build the bridge over which he was to march to victory. The bridge—which is four miles east of Stevenson—is three hundred feet in length, yet it was completed in twenty-four hours, and a regiment passed over to the further shore. As the stream which it spans is, at that point, twenty feet deep, an idea can be conceived of the magnitude of the undertaking and the extent of the labor.

"As soon as the bridge was completed the brigade was transported by cars to within four miles of Bridgeport. This was accomplished with difficulty on Monday and Tuesday mornings, the entire force not being safely landed until about noon to-day. It was found impossible to use horses on the march, which was along the railroad for a mile, so General Mitchell ordered two of his lighter guns by hand to the point of attack. The march was made slowly and quietly, the rebel pickets at a point three miles from Bridgeport not being reached until three o'clock. They were driven in, but not followed closely. They fell back upon a large cavalry force, and one regiment of infantry, who, expecting General Mitchell to advance by railroad, placed themselves in position to receive him.

"But, with a rapidity which discovered that the plan was not formed at the moment, but had been studied and formed deliberately, General Mitchell ordered a regiment to the right, and hastily and quietly the whole column marched through the woods and reached the direct road which led to Bridgeport. Fences fell, and the brushwood and wild flowers were trampled under foot by the eager men who pushed on to the

conflict for which they were so anxious. The men toiled at the heavy caissons and limbers. The rope over a hundred shoulders grew heavy, and the bearers weary, but they never halted. The road at last was reached, and on they hastened; no command, no cheering words from commanders, were necessary to urge them forward. The prospect of a fight was sufficiently invigorating."

THE REBEL ROUT.

"By this flank movement, after two hours' march, General Mitchell placed himself in that usually deemed horrible position—between two forces of the enemy. A mile to the right of our rear one regiment of infantry and two of cavalry were drawn up in position, waiting and wondering why we did not attack them. Not more than the same distance, and directly in his front, were four regiments of infantry drawn up in line of battle, and hidden from him by a hill, not more than a hundred yards to the crest, easy of ascent; a thick wood to the right, and an open field to the left. No other alarm than that given when the pickets were driven in two hours before was vouchsafed to the rebels until they received one which was an "astonisher" indeed.

"The line of battle was formed at the foot of the hill, the two pieces of artillery, charged with shell, in the center. The order was given, and the line marched forward toward the crest of the hill. Before reaching it they were halted. Above the top of the gentle slope they saw the enemy drawn up in line in their works, two pieces of artillery peering from their unfinished fort. The force looked equal to their own, and the men braced themselves for an encounter which they had feared would not test their merit. The artillery just peered above the top of the hill, catching at a glance, as it were, the scene in its front, and comprehending the duty before it. A moment's consultation ensued between General Mitchell and the Captain of artillery. The gunners fixed their scales, the pieces were graduated for the distance, and in a few seconds the two shells burst in the very midst of the grand rebel reserve. The consternation created by this unexpected attack can be better imagined than described. Their artillery was never worked. They appeared to conclude that their cavalry

and infantry regiments in front had been taken, and not relishing the same fate for themselves, they began to fall back. The consternation into which they had been thrown was evident to General Mitchell, and, after a second round of shell, he ordered a rapid advance, and over the hill and across the valley went the whole line on a double-quick. But the rebels did not wait for our approach. A stampede began, and was not finished until the river was placed between themselves and our infantry. Captain Loomis sent shell after shell after them, which only served to increase their speed, and they had soon left him out of range.

"The bridge across the river here is in two parts. The western end is a common bridge, such as one sees on railroads and turnpikes, over small streams, with the exception that this was covered. An island in the middle of the river is the eastern terminus of this part of the bridge. Thence to the eastern shore of the river is a fine structure, with a draw for the accommodation of the boats which ply thus far above the muscle shoals. In their haste the rebels did not fire the western part of the bridges, but by the time we had reached the town and river the drawbridge was in flames. There was great danger that the western half of the bridge would burn, and it was hazardous attempting to send men to the island for the purpose of saving it. A piece of artillery on the further shore could rake the whole building. General Mitchell called for volunteers to save the bridge by going to the island. 'Who of you will volunteer?' he cried. A Sergeant of the 33d Ohio sprung forward and entered the bridge. 'That's my man!' cried General Mitchell. At his heels went another, and another, and still another, till the volunteers were as plenty as they were at the President's call a year and fourteen days ago. The bridge was saved. The rebels did not fire on the party, and we did not lose a man."

THE CAVALRY SURPRISE.

"In the mean time, 'about face' had a portion of the brigade formed, with the artillery looking to what was, a moment before, our rear. As was anticipated, the rebels, whom we had flanked two miles to the rear, hearing the artillery, conceived what our movement had been, and came hastily down the

railroad. The cavalry was in the van, and dashed forward. In all probability they conceived us to be their friends. We occupied the exact position in which the rebels had been but a few minutes previously. Our pieces bore upon them, but did not open until they were so close that canister could prove effective. They came dashing toward us in fine style, and did not perceive that they had made a mistake until they were within three hundred yards of us. They were in an open wheat-field. One by one they halted, huddling together, and looking for all the world like a herd of frightened deer, undecided whether to fly or not. At this moment, General Mitchell ordered Captain Loomis to give them canister, and they waited until they got it, but no longer. The whole force fled in every direction. Such a stampede I never saw. Riderless horses screaming with pain, unhorsed but unhurt cavalry men, in one indiscriminate stampede, broke for woods, hills, valleys, and every other kind of shelter. Two cavalry companies were started in pursuit, and up to the time I write prisoners are being brought in by squads. The rebel infantry regiment, soon learning the fate of their companions, fled to the woods, and are scattered in every direction."

MITCHELL'S RESOURCES.

This fine movement gave Mitchell a clear field, particularly as the advance of Pope's division from Hamburg toward Corinth soon occupied all of Beauregard's attention on his right. His extraordinary fertility of invention, his tireless energy and exhaustless patience, added to a military talent of the highest order, have rendered Mitchell's name one of the most honored among those whose services have contributed to the success of the Union cause. An incident or two will not be out of place here as illustrative of the qualities to which we have referred. The correspondent last quoted from said :—

"When we reached the stream, over which the bridge was to be built, on Sunday—Muddy creek, as it is called—we found that the back-water had flooded it until it was three hundred feet wide, and at least twenty feet deep. How to cross it was the question; and when put to General Mitchell, he replied :—'Oh, I have a bridge in the cars.' A road was

quickly made to the edge of the stream, and down this was rolled a pontoon bridge—that is, the men unloaded and rolled down the bank sixty-six bales of cotton. They were placed in the stream, two wide, and guy ropes stretched from tree to tree through the water. Rails were run through the ropes of the bales, and thus bound them together. Then planks were laid from one bale to another, placed as the boats for pontoon bridges are placed, and the bridge was complete. General Mitchell stated that he had calculated the buoyancy of a bale of cotton, and discovered it to be four hundred and eighty-six pounds. Some idlers who knew their weight added that of four of themselves together, five hundred and three pounds, and stepped on a single bale on the water. It sunk to within an inch of being submerged, and proved the calculation of General Mitchell to be correct.

“On the march from the point at which we left the railroad, General Mitchell was always in the rear. On reaching the road leading to Bridgeport, he asked of a stranger what road it was. ‘To Bridgeport,’ said the man. ‘Can you guide us?’ asked General Mitchell. ‘Oh, you can not travel it,’ said the man, ‘for a bridge is burned and the timber fallen in.’ ‘Show me the route,’ said the General. The man refused. ‘Take him prisoner.’ A half-dozen cavalymen had him in an instant. ‘March him along!’ and away they went far ahead of the party. Directly, we saw the whole party returning. General Mitchell brought the column to a halt and they closed up. The men were ordered, not to ‘bear each a bough,’ but each one carried a rail, and, demolishing fences, they threw them into the bridge on the works of the old structure, and passed over it. Imagine three thousand men, each bearing a musket on one shoulder and a rail on the other.

“At another place, miry and muddy, we found General Mitchell, with his coat off, engaged with his body guard in completing a similar bridge, and the men passed over dryshod, as were Moses’ men crossing the Red Sea.”

The loss of Bridgeport was a great blow to the rebels, heralding, as it did, the fall of Chattanooga, and the complete retention of the Tennessee. The Macon *Telegraph* and other Southern journals heaped imprecations on the hasty flight of their troops before Mitchell’s quick-footed legion. The

Telegraph confessed that, by the loss of Bridgeport, "the most important gateway to our State was opened to the enemy, and the possession of all our rich mines of deposits of coal, iron and saltpeter are placed in imminent danger."

SUCCEEDING MOVEMENTS OF THE FEDERAL ARMY. GENERAL HALLECK IN SUPREME COMMAND.

SHERMAN'S PURSUIT.

Sherman was after the enemy early on the morning of April 8th. Of his report of the pursuit and reconnoissance he said :

"With the cavalry placed at my command, and two brigades of my fatigued troops, I went this morning out on the Corinth road. The abandoned camps of the enemy lined the road, with hospital flags for their protection. At all of these we found more or less wounded and dead. At the forks of the road I found the head of General Wool's division. At that point I ordered cavalry to examine both roads, and found the enemy's cavalry. Colonel Dickey, of the Illinois cavalry, asked for reinforcements. I ordered General Wool to advance the head of his column cautiously on the left-hand road, while I conducted the head of the third brigade of the fifth division up the right-hand road. About half a mile from the forks was a clear field, through which the road passed, and immediately beyond it a space of two hundred yards of fallen timber, and beyond that an extensive camp of the enemy's cavalry could be seen. After a reconnoissance, I ordered the two advance companies of the Ohio 77th, Colonel Hildebrand, to deploy as skirmishers, and the regiment itself to move forward into line within intervals of one hundred yards. In this order I advanced cautiously until the skirmishers were engaged. Taking it for granted that this disposition would clear the camp, I held Colonel Dickey's 40th Illinois cavalry ready to charge. The enemy's cavalry came down boldly to the charge, breaking through the line of skirmishers, when the regiment of infantry, without cause, broke,

threw away their guns and fled. The ground was admirably adapted to a defense of infantry against cavalry, it being miry and covered with fallen timber. As the regiment of infantry broke, Colonel Dickey's cavalry began to charge with their carbines, and fell into disorder. I instantly sent orders to the rear for the brigade to form in line of battle, which was promptly executed. The broken infantry and cavalry rallied on this line, and, as the enemy's cavalry came up to it, our cavalry in turn charged and drove them from the field. I then advanced the entire brigade upon the same ground, and sent Colonel Dickey's cavalry a mile further on the road. On examining the ground which had been occupied by the 77th Ohio, we found fifteen dead and about twenty-five wounded. I sent for wagons, and had all the wounded carried back to the camp, and the dead buried. I also ordered the whole camp to be destroyed. Here we found much ammunition for field-pieces, which was destroyed; also two caissons, and a general hospital, with about two hundred and eighty Confederates wounded and about fifty of our own troops. Not having the means of bringing them off, Colonel Dickey, by my order, took a surrender, signed by the medical director, Lyle, and all the attending surgeons, and a pledge to report themselves to you as prisoners of war, and also another pledge that our wounded would be carefully attended to, and surrendered to us to-morrow, as soon as ambulances could go out."

He further stated, in regard to the enemy's retreat:

"The roads are very bad, and are strewn with abandoned wagons, ambulances and limber-boxes. The enemy has succeeded in carrying off the guns, but has crippled his batteries by abandoning the hind limber-boxes of at least twenty guns. I am satisfied that the enemy's infantry and cavalry passed Lick creek this morning, traveling all last night, and that he left behind all his cavalry, which has protected his retreat. But the signs of confusion and disorder mark the whole road."*

Sherman returned to camp late in the evening. The

* An amusing but striking comment on the light in which the rebels regarded and published every reverse, is afforded in the announcements made by the rebel press of this skirmish. The *Knoxville Register* and other journals repeated:

"The prisoners taken on Sunday were sent under guard toward Corinth. Buell sent a brigade of cavalry to attempt to rescue them; but a body of

check and consequent delay experienced at the fallen timber, and the wearied condition of his troops, rendered further advances impossible.

BEAUREGARD'S LETTER.

Beauregard having "retired," sent in, by a flag of truce, April 9th, an explanation of his movements—reminding us of the story of the wife who *would* say scissors, and when put below water, so that she could not talk, made motions with her fingers indicating scissors. The document read :

"HEAD-QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI, }
MONTEREY, April 8, 1862. }

"SIR—At the close of the conflict of yesterday. my forces, being exhausted by the extraordinary length of the time during which they were engaged with yours on that and the preceding day, and it being apparent that you had received, and were still receiving reinforcements, I felt it my duty to withdraw my troops from the immediate scene of the conflict. Under these circumstances, in accordance with the usages of war, I shall transmit this under a flag of truce, to ask permission to send a mounted party to the battlefield of Shiloh, for the purpose of giving decent interment to my dead. Certain gentlemen wishing to avail themselves of this opportunity to remove the remains of their sons and friends, I must request for them the privilege of accompanying the burial-party; and in this connection I deem it proper to say I am asking what I have extended to your own countrymen under similar circumstances. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"P. G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General Commanding."

Grant's reply was brief but courteous, stating that the dead of the field had already been buried, and therefore that the party accompanying the flag of truce would not be admitted within the lines.

This ended the chapter of incidents of the Pittsburg Landing tragedy.

Confederate cavalry and artillery from Corinth not only frustrated the movement, but also captured the whole of the brigade of Federal cavalry."

Sherman, doubtless, was not surprised to hear that he was in rebel hands, a prisoner.

THE INVESTMENT OF CORINTH.

Halleck arrived at the battle-ground in the latter part of the week to assume the field command in chief. The work of reorganization and disposition commenced immediately. Pope's success at Island No. 10 placed his superb division—full twenty thousand strong—at Halleck's disposal; and his brigade were soon *en route* by transports up the Tennessee. They took position at Hamburg, four miles above Pittsburg Landing, forming the extreme left of the Federal lines. Mitchell's forces were too far to the east to constitute any part of the army proper, though his positions contributed materially to the investment of Corinth, which Halleck had determined upon. The condition of the enemy's defenses and situation seemed to render an attack by approaches the only prudent mode of reaching the rebels' stronghold and outlying defenses.

REORGANIZATION OF THE CORPS D'ARMÉE.

Great changes were made in the reorganization. The divisions of Thomas and Crittenden were added to Grant's *corps d'armée*. This left Buell but three divisions in his command, and gave Grant eight. The reserve in Grant's forces was constituted of the divisions of Lew. Wallace, Crittenden and McClernand—the command of the latter being conferred upon Brigadier-General John A. Logan. McClernand was placed in chief command of this reserve. General Thomas was placed in chief command of the remaining divisions of Grant's forces, viz: Thomas', now commanded by T. W. ("Port Royal") Sherman; W. T. Sherman; Hurlbut; McKeen,

formerly Prentiss' division; and Davies, formerly W. H. L. Wallace's division.

In the allotment of field position, Grant's forces constituted the right, Buell's the center, and Pope's the left.

THE FIRST ADVANCE.

The first advance was ordered for April 29th, the entire army moving toward the common center, Corinth. Wallace held the extreme right. McClelland moved along the lower Corinth road to a point one and a half miles west of Monterey. Sherman struck direct for a hill commanding Monterey, and occupied it on the morning of the 30th. A correspondent wrote:

"At an early hour, Sherman's division was ordered to take the advance and march to the hill opposite to and commanding Monterey, the principal point of the hill called Pea Ridge. The order was promptly obeyed, and at midday his division was in its camp. The last five miles of the march was along a belt of high land over a fine road. Over this road the great bulk of the rebel army moved before the attack on the 6th, and over the same road the main body retreated after Monday night's defeat. Occasional houses, in small openings at great distances, were the only evidences of cultivation. The few houses on the route had been used as hospitals for their wounded, and the yards about them were all filled with their graves. Everything indicated the haste of the retreat—gun-carriages, caissons, wheels, tents, and all the paraphernalia and machinery of war, broken or burned, strewed the whole line. The division of General Sherman is now (May 1st) encamped two miles nearer Corinth than the point to which he pursued them on Tuesday. All the appearances of the route of the retreat indicate that, if our troops had pursued Beauregard on Monday afternoon, the defeat would have been complete. Closely followed as far as Lick creek, the enemy, which was panic-stricken to a great extent, and in very great disorder, would have been utterly unable to cross the marshy bottom of Lee creek, and ascend Pea Ridge with their artillery and heavy trains."

THE EXPEDITION TO PURDY.

On the 30th, Wallace dispatched a force to cut the Ohio

and Mobile railroad at Bethel, south of Purdy—thus to sever the rebel communication to the North. Three battalions of cavalry and a brigade of infantry under command of Colonel Morgan L. Smith executed the commission.

“Near Purdy they found the rebels in considerable force in a piece of timber. Their orders were to destroy the road if possible, but not to engage a superior force. While the infantry and a detachment of cavalry engaged the enemy in the woods, entertaining and diverting his attention, Colonel Dickey, with two battalions of cavalry, moved in another direction to the railroad. They destroyed a bridge one hundred and twenty feet in length. The destruction was complete. While the fire which consumed the timbers was progressing, Colonel Dickey heard a train approaching from the direction of Corinth. Putting his men in ambush, he soon captured a locomotive, with a conductor, engineer and four other persons, prisoners. He found an engineer among the cavalry, who ran the locomotive about half a mile back from the bridge, fired the engine up to its utmost steam capacity and started it for the bridge. At a fearful speed the unfortunate engine plunged into the ravine, where her disjected members are piled in hopeless destruction. From the prisoners it was ascertained that three trains heavily loaded with troops were expected hourly, and the engine had been sent to help them through. These troops had been sent from Memphis, by way of Humboldt and Jackson, the direct road being entirely occupied with transportation to Corinth.”

THE FIGHTS ON THE FARMINGTON ROAD.

Buell struck direct from the Landing toward Corinth. Pope's division pushed forward from Hamburg toward Corinth, reaching a point midway after three days of terrible marching through a swamp and over heavy hills. On the 3d of May, a reconnoissance in force toward Farmington was ordered. The extraordinary nature of the country—whose fastnesses and silences were, evidently, never before penetrated by an engineer's eye—constrained Halleck to feel his way. Each day's advance was only made after reconnoissance and the location of every bearing. The reconnoissance toward

Farmington was an important and somewhat hazardous enterprise, and was, therefore, ordered *in force*.

Generals Paine and Palmer were detailed for the work, and at ten o'clock on the 3d instant were on the march. The regiments selected were the 10th, 16th, 22d, 27th, 42d and 51st Illinois volunteers, 10th and 16th Michigan volunteers, Yates' sharpshooters, Illinois; Houghtailing's (Illinois) and Hezcock's (Ohio) batteries, and the 2d Michigan cavalry. The column proceeded out on the Farmington road about five miles, when it encountered the enemy's pickets (cavalry). A sharp skirmish followed, by which the enemy lost eight killed and as many wounded (taken prisoners). A second skirmish soon followed, as the Federal forces advanced through the swamp. It was but a momentary affair, however, for the sharpshooters soon dislodged the rebels from their lodges behind trees and thickets. Colonel Bissell's corps of sappers and miners—of New Madrid canal celebrity—piloted the way, building bridges over water-courses and removing obstructions which the enemy had thrown in the way.

At three P. M., the vanguard emerged from the swamp. A correspondent wrote :

"Now commenced the fight in earnest. The enemy had posted four pieces of artillery upon an elevation of perhaps twenty feet in height, completely commanding the road, and making it utterly impossible for our troops to gain the open field, except by a *détour* to the right or left. Then Colonel Morgan's (10th) regiment were sent to the right, with the Yates' sharpshooters to the left, who soon poured such a fire of musketry upon the ranks, as sent the gunners from their pieces in confusion, and caused the infantry to rush pell-mell over the hill to their second position, where they formed in line of battle. Then the rebel postillions galloped up to the guns, limbered them up, and dragged them away, under a most galling fire from our infantry.

"Their second position was taken upon the crest of a hill, to the right of the Farmington road, just in advance of a piece of dense wood, being flanked upon the left by an old cotton-gin and press, and on the right and in front by a deep, though not impassable ravine. It now became apparent that the enemy were determined only to treat us to a cannon fight ;

and had taken such a position as to preclude us from advancing upon them, except by a circuitous route of some two miles, which, being through swamp and brush, was impassable. So Houghtailing's guns were brought forward, and emerging from the timber at a double-quick, went into battle upon the same ground just vacated by the rebels. Now, for half an hour, a terrible artillery duel was kept up, the enemy showing a spirit of chivalry worthy a better cause, two regiments of infantry in the mean time going around and gaining a position commanding their left flank, and opening upon them with musketry, at a distance of only about three hundred yards, such a fire as sent their butternut-colored ranks into the tall timber as if the old Nick or some other justice of the peace was after them. Finding themselves deserted by their infantry support, the rebel artillerists changed their position to a point about a half mile further on. Their new position was just to the right of the road leading from Farmington to Corinth, upon the brow of a hill, and about three-eighths of a mile north of the village of Farmington. Houghtailing's battery immediately moved up to the enemy's second position at the cotton-gin, while Hezcock's battery proceeded to an open field in front of Farmington and to the enemy's right, from which two points our fire soon became too terrible for humanity to endure, and the rebels fled in confusion in the direction of Corinth. Then our infantry were drawn up at the town and along the roads, while the cavalry were sent on after the flying foe."

The position thus gained was held, and soon Pope was installed at a point of great strategic and active importance—under the very nose of the rebel lines around their main defenses. Had he been permitted his own way, he would have, with Buell's help, walked straight into Corinth. Future events proved that he could have done so, though at a fearful sacrifice.

THE ENSEMBLE.

The forward movement was on the line of a circle section, whose center was Corinth. Its *ensemble* was thus characterized on the ground: "From our extreme right to our extreme left, it is about seven miles. For that entire distance there is

an almost continuous succession of encampments of infantry, cavalry and artillery. These innumerable canvas villages, with their swarms of men and animals, representing together a population equal to that of a first-class city—the *thousands* of army wagons that cover every road from the river—the martial music, the singing and shouting of the soldiery, the neighing of horses and the braying of mules—all resounding from every hill and ravine—form an *ensemble*, the like of which will probably never be seen again west of the Alleghany Mountains.”

THE FORCE.

The divisions of Sigel, Asboth and Jeff. C. Davis, from Missouri, were added to the strength of Halleck's forces the middle of May—thus giving him an army of about one hundred and twenty thousand men, nominally—probably about one hundred thousand strong—an army large and “plucky” enough to have driven Beauregard into the Gulf of Mexico, if fighting was all that was necessary to accomplish that desirable end. Halleck's strategy, however, seemed to aim at an end rather by *compression* than by dagger-thrusts. His tremendous train of artillery was, evidently, to do the chief part of the fighting. *No army ever took the field with a finer complement of guns.* Had the country between the Tennessee river and Corinth been else than an unimaginably horrible slough for several miles of the way, the probabilities are, the artillery would have brought matters to a crisis by May 10th.

ATTACK ON POPE'S ADVANCE.

The occupation of Farmington and vicinity by Pope's advanced grand guard, gave the rebels so much annoyance, that they came out in overwhelming force on the 9th (May) to drive him back, and, possibly, to flank the Federal lines. The enemy's forces numbered about thirty-five thousand, under command of Bragg, Price, Van Dorn and Ruggles. Pope had been particularly enjoined not to engage the enemy in strength; and these orders were repeated by telegraph, when Halleck was informed of the enemy's assault on the brigade at Farmington.

A correspondent of the *Commercial Gazette* wrote: “Opposed to the rebels was simply our grand guard, composed

of a single brigade. They threw forward five or six of their regiments, with artillery, to engage our brigade, holding their immense reserve in readiness to attack our anticipated reinforcements. But no reinforcements came, and for five hours that single brigade kept up the fierce contest, and held its ground. At last the rebels pressed forward too heavily for them, and General Pope, forbidden to reinforce, was compelled to withdraw the gallant guard from the unequal contest.

“During the progress of the fight, at the regular hour, the guard had been relieved, Plummer’s brigade relieving Palmer’s. Both were composed of Illinois, Michigan and Missouri troops exclusively. At the close, our loss was found to be ten killed and about a hundred wounded, many of the latter very slightly. The rebel loss was known to be at least as great.

“The rebels, puzzled by the stubborn fighting and sudden retreat of the single brigade, and by the unaccountable non-appearance of reinforcements, made no pursuit, and before nightfall retired to their intrenchments.”

This sally by the rebels led Pope to suspect, for the moment, that it really was an attack to cover an evacuation. Pope therefore ordered the men to be alert—to have two days’ cooked rations in their haversacks. Farmington was not reoccupied by the Federals until the 17th, when a commanding position for defense was chosen, and all night long heavy details from the entire division were made for the work of erecting batteries and mounting siege guns. Pope was thus in the nearest proximity to the enemy, and momentarily expected the assault which his position seemed to covet. Why he was not attacked is a mystery only explainable on the supposition that the rebel commander either distrusted his men or had decided to evacuate.

PARALLEL THE FIRST.

How “the approach” was made we are informed by the dozen or more newspaper men who were with the army up to the hour when Halleck promulgated the order granting the reportorial corps *unlimited leave of absence*. One of them said :

“When the first works were thrown up, the right of General Thomas—the right wing—rested on the Purdy road, and

his left on the main Corinth road. Buell's right was on the main Corinth road, and extended to Pope's right—the latter's left resting one mile from Farmington, on the Farmington and Hamburg road, a continuation of the Corinth and Farmington road. The advance was made, and the position being found secure and tenable, the work of intrenching began. With their arms stacked near and the artillery in position, the whole line went to work and had soon completed its labors. One who has not watched the process can have no idea how soon a regiment will intrench its entire line. The great sapling trees are felled with a rapidity that is astonishing, and practiced woodsmen ply the ax upon the fallen trees, cutting them to the correct length, as busy hands place the timbers in their position. The brushwood is piled upon it, and the spades and shovels quickly bury the mass in the clay and soil thrown up from the rear. This is the side that Pillow was accused of ditching upon; but I imagine the renegade old rascal knew what he was about. You have no idea how strong these works are after they have had a few hours to settle. A six-pounder would hardly penetrate a foot, if discharged at only half a mile distance. At the right of each brigade (except that on the extreme right), a battery of artillery was to be looked to, and the infantry regiments on either side of them had the labor to perform. In some instances mere breast-works were thrown up, but in most cases neat, strong and extensive demi-lune forts have been constructed with embrasures for the six pieces. This gives an enfilading fire which the rebels will find quite dangerous should they conclude to attack. Siege guns were also put in position, the telegraph connected the different head-quarters, the camps were moved forward, and peaceable possession taken of the new position. Peaceable! I was looking for "Agate," of the *Cincinnati Gazette*, in the camp of the Fourteenth Ohio, when a shell took off the top of Colonel Steadman's tent, and exploded fifty feet from us. You could have heard the Colonel order the boys to 'fall in' had you been at Corinth."

This parallel was struck after several regular advances. May 20th a heavy reconnoissance was made, in order to locate the enemy's exact positions. This done, the entire line deflected a little to the left until within three miles of Corinth

when the first line of intrenchments was struck—one and a half miles from the enemy's outer works, and fifteen from Pittsburg Landing.

PARALLEL THE SECOND.

The same writer said :

“ But we rested in peace only a day. Our Generals disturbed us this time, and another advance was ordered. We had been encamped two regiments deep behind the first parallel—that is, a brigade formed in camp in a square of four regiments. But when we rested behind the second works, I found we had advanced a quarter of a mile futher forward, more than that distance to the right, and now all fronted the line. General Sherman's works extended beyond the Purdy road. General Buell's right, General Wood's division, crossed the main Corinth road; but Pope's left rested where it had been before, save that it was a mile in the advance. By this you will understand that the line was lengthened—lengthened the length of a division, about half a mile. Do you see what it threatened? The left flank of the rebels. Do you see what it exposed? Our own right flank. And so forward moved the right reserve two divisions, and protected it.

“ I rode along the line yesterday, despite of provost marshals and my doctor. The works are of the same character as those described under the preceding head—they are built in the same manner, is what I mean. It must not be supposed that they are built on scientific plans, from drawings by ‘topogs;’ but each Colonel of a regiment throws up his breastwork to suit the ground in his front—thus the line is often broken and unconnected. On my trip along the line I got into Nelson's division, and found my eye gladdened by an open field—almost a prairie. But in the midst of it an unaccountable growth of small timber caught my eye, and I rode toward it; approached and passed it. Six terrible black thirty-twos were behind it. ‘A masked battery of siege guns,’ said the guard, in reply to an inquiry. A little further on I found four other guns, and near by, completely hidden, an entire regimental camp. Crossing, afterward, to the right, I found similar masks, behind one of which I found ‘Lady Halleck,’ ‘Lady Buell,’ ‘Old Abe,’ and some other thirty-two pounders,

standing stately and silently in a heavy demi-lune, and looking grim on Corinth. There are hundreds of other matters of interest along the line which I can not give at this time. The division and brigade organizations of the three grand corps have been sent you for use at the proper time."

PARALLEL THE THIRD.

Of the third and last parallel he wrote, under date of May 27th :

"A third parallel of works is approaching completion in our front, three or four hundred yards nearer the enemy. Going along the line to-day, I found batteries being built in the advance of our works and within thirteen hundred yards of the enemy, in which siege guns were being planted. These preparations are of the most formidable character, and ought to reduce the rebels' works in a short time and cause an evacuation, if one has not already taken place. In front of Port Royal Sherman's division I found Robert McCook's brigade engaged in throwing up protection for four thirty-two-pounders which looked directly upon the rebel center. Similar batteries approach completion, and I hope to hear the opening of the cannonading to-morrow. Whether the enemy be there or not, the bombardment will not be long. The siege will quickly terminate when once the preparations are ended, and the conflict opens with the vigor which those preparations promise."

INCIDENTS.

During these several progresses and processes, numerous skirmishes transpired in which both rebels and Federals showed hardihood and bravery enough to immortalize any European people, but added nothing to the repute of American valor because it was expected and required, and a matter of course. Some of them were thus referred to by one of the correspondents :

"Each day, in the early light of morning, the pickets open with sharp-shooters' practice, and all day, all along the line, is heard the sharp crack of the squirrel rifle, the louder report of the Enfield, and the duller croak of the common rifle-musket, resounding along the line and re-echoed by the rebels.

It would be impossible for me to state in detail the numerous adventures along the line of the outposts. I have memorandums in full of how a Lieutenant Hope, 4th Kentucky, who, while under arrest, has been scouting around the camp, and who, while General Sherman was deciding whether to bombard a certain house in which a rebel company had fortified themselves, enlisted two other officers who were in the same suspended state as himself, and succeeded in storming the house and dislodging the rebels; memorandums of sharpshooters' practice, storming-parties who have made descents on cotton-gins and spring-houses situated in the disputed territory; another memorandum calls to mind the rapid manner in which Colonel Steadman, of the 14th Ohio, insisted on assembling his regiment when a rebel shell took off the top of his Sibley.

"Saturday, the 17th, General Hurlbut was taking his position on the right when he came upon a force of infantry and artillery, with whom he immediately became engaged. The purpose was to throw up the intrenchments on a line with those which were being made on the left. He advanced his artillery, with infantry at supporting distance, and prepared to shell out the rebels who had driven back his advancing skirmishers. The rebels replied with vigor, and the shelling continued for an hour and a half. The men, who had been at Donelson and at Pittsburg Landing, looked upon the shelling as a matter of amusement and laughed at it. The artillery of both parties was admirably handled, and that of the rebels did considerable execution. On the left a couple of regiments of infantry became engaged, and added to the interest of the engagement. After fighting for an hour and a half the rebels withdrew, leaving us in possession of the position and with twenty-five killed and one hundred and fifty wounded of our men on our hands."

AN INTERESTING EPISODE. .

One of those conferences of friend and foe which it is at once painful and pleasurable to contemplate occurred on the 18th. It illustrated the peculiar relations of the belligerents so clearly that we may report the narrative of its incidents as given by the Cincinnati *Gazette* representative—particularly as

it introduces us to Hon. Jacob Thompson, Mr. Buchanan's Secretary of the Interior :

"McCook's division of Buell's army, and Port Royal Sherman's, of Thomas's army, with some other troops, were under orders to make a reconnoissance in force 'beyond Seven Mile Creek toward the enemy's lines' yesterday morning—the movement to begin at half-past eight o'clock. Learning the direction they were to take, I resolved to avoid the crowding in the roads while the troops were marching, by riding on ahead of them to our outer pickets, and there awaiting their approach. I soon had reason to rejoice at the lucky determination.

"Galloping out on the old Corinth road leading past Halleck's new head-quarters, I soon left the camps and the forming regiments to the rear. Presently the grand guard came in sight, then smaller outposts of pickets, and finally, within a mile and a half of the camps, came the last picket line. Looking down the next turn of the road, beyond the two or three blue coats on duty, I noticed a group of officers, among whom were two conspicuous for the gaudy uniform of the Confederate army, while the presence, just beyond, of a tall, gray-coated private, bearing a white flag, explained the phenomenon.

"Riding up, I was introduced to Colonel Thompson, of General Beauregard's staff. The cordial warmth of manner, the fine head, expressive features, and grizzly beard and mustache were not unfamiliar in Washington, even so late as the beginning of the present year. It was Mr. Buchanan's well-known Secretary of the Interior, the Hon. Jacob M. Thompson, Mississippi millionaire, ex-Congressman from the very district on whose soil he now stood under a flag of truce, and a man still entitled to Northern respect, as the only one of the resigning secessionists who left Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet without the stain of dishonor upon his name.

"The Colonel had been sent in by General Beauregard to turn over to General Halleck some sixty-two prisoners recently captured near Fort Heiman, Tennessee (and released under parole not to bear arms against the Confederacy until regularly exchanged), and to see what General Halleck would agree to in the way of a general system of exchanges. He was escorted by Beauregard's body-guard, a fine body of

cavalry from New Orleans under the command of Captain Dreux. It might be ungenerous, after the very pleasant interview we had, but our officers could not repress their suspicions that there was another object besides the release of sixty-two prisoners, and that they were desirous of learning precisely where our lines were, and what more they could, by penetrating them as far as possible.

"They had, of course, been stopped beyond our outer pickets, and an hour or more of pleasant talk filled up the interval, while Beauregard's letter to Halleck, and Thompson's request for a personal interview, were taken back to headquarters, and answers awaited. Both the Colonel and Captain Dreux made themselves as agreeable as possible, and there was a sort of tacit understanding by which both sides avoided unpleasant subjects.

"They were profuse in their expressions of regret that the war should have broken out at all, and particularly bitter against the abolitionists. 'We don't like to fight you Northern men,' said Colonel Thompson; 'it grieves us to think of having to meet men we like, as we do you, in battle; we want to fight your abolitionists. I know,' he continued, 'you have very few of them here; but if you could collect a regiment of them, I'd like to pick out a regiment of our fire-eaters, and have them brought out face to face in an open field. I'd be willing to abide by the result, go which way it would. But we don't like to have to fight you.'

"'I do regret one thing,' he said, again addressing himself to the officer commanding the pickets of the 17th Ohio, Colonel Connell, whom he had known as an old-line Democrat, 'and that is, that the old Democratic party is permitting itself to be used by the abolitionists, and is now absolutely under their control.' Colonel Connell disputed the proposition. 'You'll see how it will be when the war is over,' said Colonel Thompson. 'Even now you can see how Congress is drifting, and the current is sure to set stronger and stronger in the same direction.' 'But you might have checked the current if your members had stayed in Congress,' suggested a bystander. 'Oh, no; we might, perhaps, have pushed off the evil day a little further, but that was all. Abolitionism is going to sweep every thing before it, just as we foresaw it would. It

was just as well to meet the matter now as any time, but we did not expect you Northern Democrats to help swell the abolition power.'

" 'One of the saddest of all the sad things in this war,' said the Colonel, again, 'is in cases like this: Lieutenant —— is in our army. He has two brothers with you. One of them, some months ago, was severely wounded at Mill Spring, where he fought too, and he has never yet been able to learn whether he died or not. Can any of you tell me?' Unfortunately, none of us knew, and so the family suspense remains unbroken, notwithstanding the Colonel's kindly effort.

"At last the officer returned from Halleck's head-quarters. The General could not consent that Colonel Thompson should come within our lines as requested, and he would be willing to reciprocate the release of prisoners by returning them an equal number in exchange. Colonel Thompson was evidently chagrined at being allowed to go no further, but he was too politic as well as too gentlemanly to manifest any open dissatisfaction. He must complain of the United States, however, for its course with reference to the exchange of prisoners. It had added needless barbarism to the war, and its practice was in direct violation of the usages of civilized nations. Certainly the South had done enough fighting to entitle herself to treatment as at least a fighting power. There was too much good sense in this to give any ground for dispute, and so the interview ended, as it had begun, in the most perfect harmony.

"The prisoners—a sorry-looking set—were marched forward, the rebel cavalry turned them over to our officers, a descriptive roll was produced, and sixty-two released prisoners answered very joyfully as their names were called. Colonel Connell inquired whether they wished them sworn not to bear arms against the Confederacy till regularly exchanged. 'Oh, we've attended to that already,' said Colonel Thompson, 'and I guess it's pretty well impressed on their minds.' Some ale was produced, and rebels and Unionists alike drank out of the same tin cup. 'If we could only take you up to our camp, we could give you something better,' said one of our officers. 'Oh, never mind,' replied a rebel, with a quizzical look, 'we expect to entertain all you gentlemen at *our* quarters pretty

soon, and depend on it, this party shall have the best old brandy Corinth affords.

"The leave-taking grew protracted. Each one had something to say or ask. Hands were shaken with marked cordiality all around. 'May we meet again under pleasanter auspices,' said Colonel Thompson, and there wasn't one of the party that did not fervently echo the wish, and inwardly hope that he might some day have an opportunity to do a kindness to this officer of Beauregard's staff. But at last there was no excuse for waiting longer. Mounting their horses, the Colonel and Captain waved a final adieu, and with uncovered heads rode on; the body-guard wheeled in behind them, every man lifting his cap as he passed our officers, and so, under the white flag, the courteous rebels left us. May our balls and shells deal lightly with that party in the coming day!

CAPTURE OF RUSSELL'S HOUSE.

A brilliant affair occurred on the 17th, under direction of General W. T. Sherman, in the capture of a commanding position named Russell's House, from the residence on it. Hurlbut put in motion two regiments and a battery, at three P. M. General Denver, with an equal force, moved around to the right, so as to strike the point on the left when General Smith's brigade had opened the fight in front. Smith's (Morgan L.) brigade, with Bouton's artillery, took the main road and passed direct to the house. The engagement soon began. Smith pressed the enemy sharply. Bouton's artillery riddled the house and out-buildings, and the rebels retired precipitately. The head of Denver's and Hurlbut's columns came in sight in time to see the enemy run. Smith's loss was ten killed and thirty-one wounded, from the 8th Missouri and the 55th Illinois regiments. The rebels left twelve dead on the field, and bore away several dead, supposed to be officers.

THE END COMING.

The several approaches had prepared the Federal army for the final assault, which was arranged for May 28th. During the night, Nelson had pushed across the swamp, over Seven Mile creek, intervening between the center and the enemy's works. The swamp was bridged in corduroy under the very

guns of the fortifications beyond. To the line of this creek, the whole advance was made on the 28th, and a general reconnoissance inaugurated. That on the left, by Pope, brought on an engagement, since, as it afterward appeared, the left menaced the enemy's line of retreat in evacuation—at that moment going on.

THE LINES ENGAGED.

Of Pope's fight, a writer for the New York *Herald* said :

“It was nine o'clock on the morning of the 28th, which was Wednesday, before Pope opened on the left and began the reconnoissance, which, it was soon evident, was general from the rapid firing in McKeon's division, and further to the right in (Kentucky) Sherman's. I had from the first anticipated that the work would be on the right—that Thomas' corps would have to do the labor, and I pushed from the right of Buell—the center—toward the right. I found myself, shortly after, in front of the division of Sherman (Port Royal), and concluded that it would be wisdom to retire to his rear, ere he became engaged. I passed McKeon, who was marching forward in splendid style, in line of battle, unbroken except where his left brigade filed around a demi-curve in the third parallel, and again formed in a broad open field to the right of the house, which the topographical engineers have not dignified by a name. I fell in with a battery of artillery belonging to Major Cavender's battalion, and saw some excellent practice at the tops of tall and distant beech and hickory trees. They told me the shells which were trimming the tops of the trees were falling in the works at Corinth, to which in silence I acquiesced. Sherman and Hurlbut were quiet. Infantry and artillery were advancing down the Purdy road, and the thousand and one roads which have been made in the past few days; but they had encountered no enemy as yet. Indeed, the right and center have had a comparatively easy time of it; but Pope, on the left, has suffered in his advance. The right and center encountered no enemy until they had reached the swamp and pushed through it toward the creek. Pope, on the contrary, met a determined resistance, and I found at night that his line was but little further advanced than the third parallel of the center and right.

Operating in an open space of some miles in extent, he has not been able to advance his lines as rapidly as did Buell and Thomas. But the engagement—if the skirmishing of the day can be called such—began when the right and center had reached the swamp, and while yet the left was trying to obtain the same position. There was no distinguishing any thing. Along the whole line—a hundred yards in my front—the fight was raging. You could hear the sharp reports and the shouts, the commands, the cheers, the loud laughter. But what more could be seen, save occasionally the white smoke rising from the leveled weapons which had just been discharged? The ambulances were being slowly filled. The wounded bodies were being brought from the swamps, and the surgeons would gather around the subject. You could hear cries of pain, and curses, and groans, mingling with the wilder cries of the excited combatants, who were hidden in the woods that encircled them. This style of skirmishing was kept up during the whole day. The combatants on the right and center maintained their original position, and Thomas and Buell bivouacked where they had fought—in the damp, miry swamps. The night was spent in preparations for an advance in the morning. Was it not plain that no force was at Corinth?

“The resistance of the rebels to Pope’s advance was more stubborn, and the conflict during the day was more determined, more exciting, and resulted in greater loss than perhaps in both the other corps. Not only was he opposed by infantry but artillery, and so exposed was his position, that the latter, I am told, has occasioned quite a heavy loss. The point of crossing of the creek was defended by a battery of rifled guns, which Pope had found exceedingly effective, and he was content when night came to rest in the plain, and make his preparations for reducing the battery at early dawn of the following day. The troops of the three divisions bivouacked on the field, where they had stood mostly inactive the whole day, Hamilton’s left resting on the Farmington road.”

OPERATIONS OF THE RIGHT.

The position obtained at Russell’s House on the 17th, (see page 81), had been strongly intrenched as a base for the

operations of Sherman's ("Kentucky" Sherman) division on the 28th. On that day he was ordered to advance and secure a log-house standing on a ridge, giving a near and commanding position. The place was then held by the enemy—supposed to be in strong force. Sherman, in his official report, said :

"The house referred to by General Halleck was a double log-building standing on a high ridge on the upper or southern end of the large field before referred to as the one to which we had advanced our pickets. The enemy had taken out the chinks and removed the roof, making it an excellent block-house from which, with perfect security, he could annoy our pickets. The large field was perfectly overlooked by this house, as well as by the ridge along its southern line of fence, which was covered by a dense grove of heavy oaks and underbrush. The main Corinth road runs along the eastern fence, while the field itself, about three hundred yards wide by about five hundred yards long, extended far to the right into the low land of Phillip's creek, so densely wooded as to be impassable to troops or artillery. On the eastern side of the field, the woods were more open. The enemy could be seen at all times in and about the house and the ridge beyond, and our pickets could not show themselves on our side of the field without attracting a shot."

THE LOG-HOUSE ASSAULT

"The problem was," the report continues, "to clear the house and ridge of the enemy with as little loss as possible. To accomplish this, I ordered General J. W. Denver, with his brigade (3d), and the Morton battery of four guns, to march in perfect silence from our lines at eight A. M., keeping well under cover as he approached the field ; General Morgan L. Smith's brigade (1st), with Barrett's and Waterhouse's batteries, to move along the main road, keeping his force well masked in the woods to the left ; Brigadier-General Veatch's brigade to move from General Hurlbut's lines through the woods on the left of and connecting with General Morgan L. Smith's, and General John A. Logan's brigade to move down to Bowie Hill Cut of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and thence forward and to the left, so as to connect with General Denver's brigade on the extreme right ; all to march at eight A. M., with skirmishers

ers well to the front, to keep well concealed, and at a signal to rush quickly on to the ridge, thus avoiding, as much as possible, the danger of crossing the open field, exposed to the fire of a concealed enemy. It was impossible for me, beforehand, to ascertain the force of the enemy, and nothing is more embarrassing than to make dispositions against a concealed foe, occupying, as this was, a strong natural position. I then supposed and still think this position was held by a small brigade of the enemy.

“My preliminary arrangements having thus been made, two twenty-pound Parrott rifled guns of Silfversparre’s battery, under the immediate supervision of Major Taylor, chief of artillery, were moved silently through the forest to a point behind a hill, from the top of which could be seen the house and ground to be contested. The guns were unlimbered, loaded with shell and moved by hand to the crest. At the proper time I gave the order to Major Taylor to commence firing and demolish the house or render it decidedly uncomfortable to its occupants. About a dozen shells, well directed, soon accomplished this; then designating a single shot of the twenty-pound Parrott gun of Silfversparre as a signal for the brigades to advance, I waited till all were in position, and ordered the signal, when the troops dashed forward in fine style, crossed the field, drove the enemy across the ridge and field beyond, into another dense and seemingly impenetrable forest. The enemy was evidently surprised, and only killed two of our men and wounded nine. After we had reached the ridge, he opened on us with a two-gun battery on the right, and another from the front and left, doing my brigade but little harm, but killing three of General Veatch’s men. With our artillery we soon silenced his, and by ten A. M. we were masters of the position. Generals Grant and Thomas were present during the affair and witnessed the movement, which was admirably executed, all the officers and men keeping their places like real soldiers.”

ATTEMPT TO DISLODGE SHERMAN.

The enemy, evidently annoyed at this unexpected repulse, sallied out in some force to regain the lost position, as it then appeared—though the attack was only a “make believe,” to

cover the evacuation of their stronghold, then progressing. In his report, Sherman detailed the particulars of the assault of the enemy by the dense woods in front, which so masked his operations as to render the fight a blind one on the part of the Federal brigades. The rebels were repulsed after a brisk fire, both of musketry and artillery. The new position won was nearer Corinth, and the work of intrenching went on during the night of the 28th. On the morning of the 29th, a line of defenses was constructed, which gave the Federals a powerful foothold within one thousand and three hundred yards of the enemy's main works.

THE END.

Of the advance of the right into the enemy's works, Sherman gave the following spirited narration :

"I had then my whole division in a slightly curved line, facing south ; my right resting on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, near a deep cut known as Bowie Hill Cut, and left resting on the main Corinth road, at the crest of the ridge, there connecting with General Hurlbut, who, in turn, on his left, connected with General Davies, and so on down the whole line to its extremity. So near was the enemy, that we could hear the sound of his drums and sometimes of voices in command, and the railroad cars arriving and departing at Corinth were easily distinguished. For some days and nights, cars had been arriving and departing very frequently, especially in the night ; but last night, (29th), more so than usual, and my suspicions were aroused. Before daybreak, (30th), I instructed the brigade commanders and the field officer of the day, to feel forward as far as possible, but all reported the enemy's pickets still in force in the dense woods to our front. But about six A. M., a curious explosion, sounding like a volley of large siege pieces, followed by others singly, and in twos and threes, arrested our attention, and soon after a large smoke arose from the direction of Corinth, when I telegraphed to General Halleck to ascertain the cause. He answered that he could not explain it, but ordered me to ' advance my division and feel the enemy, if still in my front.' I immediately put in motion two regiments of each brigade by different roads, and soon after followed with

the whole division, infantry, artillery and cavalry. Somewhat to our surprise, the enemy's chief redoubt was found within thirteen hundred yards of our line of intrenchments, but completely masked by the dense forest and undergrowth. Instead of having, as we supposed, a continuous line of intrenchments encircling Corinth, his defenses consisted of separate redoubts, connected in part by a parapet and ditch, and in part by shallow rifle-pits; the trees being felled so as to give a good field of fire to and beyond the main road."

INTO CORINTH.

Sherman continued: "General Morgan L. Smith's brigade moved rapidly down the main road, entering the first redoubt of the enemy at seven A. M., May 30th. It was completely evacuated, and he pushed on into Corinth and beyond, to College Hill, there awaiting my orders and arrival. General Denver entered the enemy's lines at the same time, seven A. M., at a point midway between the wagon and railroads, and proceeded on to Corinth, about three miles from our camp; and Colonel McDowell kept further to the right, near the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. By eight A. M., all my division was at Corinth, and beyond.

"On the whole ridge extending from my camp into Corinth, and to the right and left, could be seen the remains of the abandoned camps of the enemy; flour and provisions scattered about, and every thing indicating a speedy and confused retreat. In the town itself, many houses were still burning, and the ruin of warehouses and buildings containing commissary and other Confederate stores were still smouldering; but there still remained piles of cannon balls, shells and shot, sugar, molasses, beans, rice and other property which the enemy had failed to carry off or destroy. Major Fisher, of the Ohio 54th, was left in Corinth with a provost guard, to prevent pillage and protect the public stores still left.

"From the best information picked up from the few citizens who remained in Corinth, it appeared that the enemy had for some days been removing their sick and valuable stores, and had sent away on railroad cars a part of their effective force on the night of the 28th. But, of course, even the vast

amount of their rolling stock could not carry away an army of a hundred thousand men.

"The enemy was, therefore, compelled to march away, and began the march by ten o'clock on the night of the 29th—the columns filling all the roads leading south and west all night; the rear-guard firing the train which led to the explosion and conflagration, which gave us the first real notice that Corinth was to be evacuated. The enemy did not relieve his pickets that morning, and many of them had been captured, who did not have the slightest intimation of their purpose.

"Finding Corinth abandoned by the enemy, I ordered General Morgan L. Smith to pursue on the Ripley road, by which it appeared they had taken the bulk of their artillery.

"Captain Hammond, my chief of staff, had been and continued with General Smith's brigade, and pushed the pursuit up to the bridges and narrow causeway, by which the bottom of Tuscumbia creek is passed. The enemy opened with canister on the small party of cavalry, and burned every bridge, leaving the woods full of straggling soldiers. Many of these were gathered up and sent to the rear, but the main army had escaped across Tuscumbia creek, and further pursuit by a small party would have been absurd, and I kept my division at College Hill until I received General Thomas's orders to return and resume our camps of the night before; which we did, slowly and quietly, in the cool of the evening."

POPE'S OPERATIONS.

Pope's position pressed the enemy's right, as we have seen, very closely, and met with a strong opposition. This opposition delayed the storming of the Corinth intrenchments, as determined upon, on the 29th. A correspondent who was with Pope's division wrote :

"Along our whole line the silence of the past night had been maintained. We knew on the left that Buell and Thomas held the creek, that Sherman had crossed the bridge on the Purdy road, and Nelson that on the main Corinth road. The work of bridging the swamp had begun, and had been finished during the night, and all waited for Pope. He is not a man to delay any one, and he quickly went to work to bring his line forward with that of the rebels. It had been hoped that

the line would be so advanced on Wednesday night that the storming could be begun and finished on Thursday. But eight and nine o'clock came, and still the enemy opposed the left. It is now apparent why the resistance was so great on this wing. The retreat is said to have been by the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and the purpose has been to obstruct the marching upon that point as long as possible. If rumors were to be believed, the rebels have found serious obstructions in the way of their retreat by that road. I heard on Wednesday night, and again on yesterday, that General James S. Jackson, in command of a brigade of cavalry, consisting of his own Kentucky regiment, the 2d Ohio and 1st Ohio, had pushed south for the purpose of obstructing the Mobile and Ohio Railroad; but you can not be sure of any thing that you hear in the camp. If this be true, and the expedition shall succeed, the division which it is now ascertained we have been fighting may be captured."

It was true, however. Pope, from his tree-top observations—[Why was Halleck not supplied with balloons for observation?—one ascension on the 28th would have revealed to him the enemy's proceedings, and a general assault would have given him the bulk of the rebels as prisoners with most of this immense train of stores,]—had made up his mind that the evacuation was going on; and he had, therefore, dispatched the force of cavalry referred to (under Colonel Elliott, not General Jackson) to break the railroad *in the rear* of Corinth. The impatient and sharp-sighted General had no idea of allowing the entire force and trains of Beauregard to escape entirely.

On the night of the 28th, Pope erected a battery to match one which lay in his way, and promised to annoy him much, if not disposed of. The morning of the 29th found his heavy siege guns mounted, and a few hours sufficed to send the Confederates back to their main intrenchment. The firing from Pope's battery was very precise. His artillery had had so much practice as to become "sharpshooters" with thirty-two pounders. General Hamilton pressed forward to the outer edge of the intervening swamp and engaged the enemy's outer line of pickets at long range. When the battery was relieved, Hamilton on the right and General Payne on the

left pressed forward, and with a yell were now within the works; Corinth was twice won.

GOOD FRIDAY.

As already chronicled, Sherman was within the enemy's breastworks early on Friday A. M. The entire line, however, was moving. Sherman was only one of the many divisions whom the early dawn found in line, ready for the last storm and hand-to-hand struggle—for such all believed it would prove—and for such a contest all were prepared. We may now reproduce the graphic picture of the marshaling of that mighty host, drawn by one who was present:

“On Thursday night we rested in possession of Seven-Mile creek, and within three hundred yards of the enemy's works. On the left the 39th Ohio held the bridge of the road, by which General Payne's Illinois division crossed during the night. On the main Corinth road the 18th Regulars and the 9th Ohio shared the honor of taking the bridge with one of Wood's regiments. Sherman had placed the brigade of Stuart, of the 55th Illinois, on the southern side of the bridge on the Purdy road, and the rest of his division were engaged in building roads for the several brigades composing it. It was then evident that the morning must end the conflict.

“Friday morning dawned beautifully clear, pleasant, and cool. In the gray of the morning our labors began, and the advance was sounded along the whole line. The morning *reveille* had not been omitted. The first streak of coming light had aroused the drummer-boys on the left (Pope's), away two miles to the east, and we heard his drums and the accompanying fife play the inspiring air which has lost so much of its spirit by its too common use in camp. The next division caught up the sound and nearer it came. The twang of the horn in the camps of the artillery and cavalry mingled with the drums of the infantry in pleasing melody, and the whole army woke to the pleasant strain—pleasing on this morn, waking them, as it did, to the labor whose danger only makes it the more exciting and delightful. There were rations of grog, with the meat and hard bread ('Lincoln platforms,' as the boys call the crackers); and each man, no doubt, felt the better for the draught; quickly, indeed, was that meal

dispatched. There was a desire on the part of the men to get out of the swamp. For two nights they had slept in their trenches; they thirsted to sleep in those of the enemy.

"Noiselessly into line they formed in the center. I watched the veterans of Mill Spring in the morning as they came into line. The 'bully Dutch' of McCook toed the mark, with the Kentuckians of the 10th, and the tall, spare Minnesotians of the 2d Regiment formed on their left. There was silence and awe, and the men were serious as they stood there at a 'rest,' but there was no flinching. Pipes were lighted after the morning meal, and still protruded from the lips of the brave fellows who puffed and looked serious. Men put huge chews of tobacco in their mouths, as if they thought it might be their last, or that that chew would have to last them all day. The human face is a wonderful study in such an hour as that of this morning's dawn.

"The knapsacks were thrown from the shoulders and placed in huge piles in the rear. Men threw their blankets tied about them from their loins, and coats were dispensed with and shirt-sleeves rolled up. You could see the old crumpled letters taken from knapsacks and put into the pockets of the gray shirts which they wore; and there were letters, newly written and carefully directed, disposed of, so that by them the body, if it should be lifeless when the sun set, might be identified. And then came the bugle, and men started as if startled from thought or sleep. The quick command—clear and loud—and all came to an 'order arms.' The preliminaries were gone through with, and the line moved slowly forward. You know the rest—I have premised it in my preface to this letter. Up the hill at a double-quick—silently and swiftly, over the rifle-pit, on to the heavier works, across the ditch, over the walls with a spring and into the works with a cheer which told the story to the rest of the line. The works were empty. The rebels were gone, and left but the sign of their devastation behind them.

WHY DID THEY RUN?

Corinth was, indeed, the enemy's most precious possession. Its importance was not overestimated by Johnson and Beauregard, when they made it their defense. It was the key that

unlocked the Cotton States, and gave us command of almost the entire system of Southern railroads, and nothing but despair could have prompted its abandonment. While there was a shadow of hope for the Confederacy, policy would have compelled the insurgents to hold the town. Why did they not hold it, and make good their magniloquent addresses to the Confederate forces to "stand by their country in that most momentous of modern moments"—to "protect the virtue and honor of their wives and daughters," "to hurl back the hirelings whose presence was detestation to every true Southern heart?" Ah, that "skedaddle" only further illustrated the repeatedly demonstrated fact that the Southern leaders had practiced the art of falsehood and duplicity, to a perfection bordering on the sublime. As one who was on the ground wrote:

"The conduct of the rebels is indeed beyond comprehension; here is a place commanding several important railroads; a place the seizure of which Beauregard confessed in his celebrated dispatch to Davis, would open to us the valley of the Mississippi; a position capable of as stubborn a defense as Sebastopol, and yet scarcely an effort is made to fortify it, and its possessors fly at our approach. The abettors of the rebellion in Europe are watching with eager interest every step made in this country, with a view of obtaining a recognition, at any favorable moment, of the bogus Confederacy. A stubborn resistance, even though followed by defeat, would command respect abroad; but a succession of evacuations, upon the slightest approach of danger, can insure only contempt.

"All of the citizens of Corinth, and, I believe, of the rebel States, believed the place would be held at all hazards, and the chagrin and disappointment at its evacuation without a blow were deep and bitter. I talked with several who, up to that hour, had never faltered in their faith, but who now look upon their cause as past the remotest chance of a resurrection, and are adapting themselves to their new and changed circumstances. They say that if the South could not defend Corinth, they can not hold their ground at any other point, and it is idle to prolong a war which is desolating twelve States."

THE ONE PROUD MOMENT.

A Cincinnati paper reporter, adverting to the sight which he beheld as the Federal arms all came sweeping into view before the rebel fortifications, said :

"About half-past six in the morning, orders to march were received, and at seven the greater portion of the men were outside their breastworks, cautiously feeling their way through the dense underbrush which intervened between our fortifications and the defenses of Corinth ; but, after proceeding three-eighths of a mile, they came to an open space, and the enemy's works, abandoned and desolate, burst upon their astonished gaze. The sight was entirely unexpected.

"The opening was made by the rebels, who had felled the timber for about three hundred yards in front of their intrenchments, for the double purpose of obstructing our progress and giving them a fair view of our column when within rifle-range.

"The view from the highest point of the rebel works immediately in front of Davies', now Rosecrans' division, was truly grand. The circle of vision was at least five miles in extent, stretching from the extreme right to the extreme left, and the magnificent display of banners, the bristling of shining bayonets, and the steady step of the handsomely-attired soldiers, presented a pageant which has seldom been witnessed on this continent.

"Upon many of the regimental ensigns were printed 'Wilson's Creek,' 'Dug Springs,' 'Donelson,' or 'Shiloh,' and one or two wave all these mottoes in the breeze. Those who passed through all these trying ordeals, unscathed, or who received honorable wounds in either, in future can look back upon a life devoted to their country's service, and feel that proud satisfaction which is denied to others not less patriotic, but less fortunate. In future pageants, in honor of the nation's birthday, when the last relics of former struggles have become extinct, and when these shall be bowed down with age, they will be their country's honored guests, and receive that consideration due their noble deeds.

"The troops from every direction marched toward a common center—Corinth ; and, as they neared each other, and

friends recognized friends, whom they had not seen for weeks and months, though separated but a few miles, greetings were exchanged, and as regiments met for the first time since leaving the bloody fields of Donelson and Shiloh, cheer after cheer resounded through the forests, and were echoed and reëchoed by the hills, as if the earth itself desired to prolong the sound."

Another correspondent wrote, of the order of entry and the honors of "first in the inclosure:" "Lieutenant Baker, of the Yates sharpshooters, was the first man to enter the rebel works on the left. General Pope's corps entered by the Farmington road, south of that, General Nelson by the main Corinth, and General W. T. Sherman by the Purdy road. The 27th Kentucky, of Nelson's division, claims the honor of having been the first to enter Corinth. Colonel Stuart, of Chicago, is said to have first raised the flag upon the young ladies' seminary, but Major Noyes, of the 24th Ohio, disputes it with him."

WEAKNESS OF THE FORTIFICATIONS.

Halleck, in his dispatch to the Secretary of War announcing the capture, said:

"HEAD-QUARTERS, CAMP NEAR CORINTH, May 30.

"*Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:*

"The enemy's position and works in front of Corinth were exceedingly strong. He can not occupy a stronger position in his flight. This morning he destroyed an immense amount of public and private property, stores, provisions, wagons, tents, etc. For miles out of the town, the roads are filled with arms, haversacks, etc., thrown away by his fleeing troops. A large number of prisoners and deserters have been captured, estimated by General Pope at two thousand. General Beauregard evidently distrusts his army, or he would have defended so strong a position. His troops are generally much discouraged and demoralized. In all the engagements for the last few days, their resistance has been slight.

"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General Commanding."

This strength of *position* was conceded by newspaper correspondents, but the strength of fortifications was not conceded. The Cincinnati *Times* reporter said:

"Nothing surprised me more than the character of the rebel works. From the length of time Beauregard's army had been occupying the place, with a view to its defense, and from the importance the rebel General attached to it in his dispatch which was intercepted by General Mitchell, I had been led to suppose that the fortifications were really formidable. But such was not the case. I admire the engineering which dictated the position of the intrenchments, and the lines they occupied, but that is all that deserves the slightest commendation.

"But a single line of general fortifications had been constructed, and these were actually less formidable than those thrown up by our forces, last night, after occupying a new position. There were, beside this general line, occasional rifle-pits, both outside and inside the works, but they could have been constructed by the relief details in six hours.

"The only fortifications really worthy the name, were a few points where batteries were located, but these could not have resisted our Parrot and siege guns half an hour. Yet the positions occupied by the breastworks were capable of being strengthened so as to render them almost invulnerable to a front attack, and no little difficulty would have been experienced in flanking the position, either on the right or left.

"The works were on the brow of a ridge, considerably higher than any in the surrounding country, and at the foot of it was a ravine correspondingly deep. The zig-zag course of the line gave the defenders the command of all the feasible approaches, and hundreds could have been mowed down at every step made by an assailing army, even from the imperfect earth-banks which had been thrown up.

"Had a fight occurred, it must have been decided by artillery, and in this respect we had the advantage, both in number and caliber of our guns; but had they improved the advantages they possessed, and fortified as men who really intended to make a stubborn defense, this superiority might have been overcome."

The same opinion was ventured by several other clear-headed observers. The New York *Tribune* reporter said:

"A good deal had been said about a formidable swamp in

front of the enemy's fortifications, but nothing of the kind was noticed. The 'fortifications' hardly deserved the name. They were the simplest description of breastworks, hardly affording protection for infantry from musketry, not to speak of artillery. They are not half as strong as those constructed by our troops in a single night. Their appearance indicated that they were hastily thrown up some time since—probably after the retreat of the rebels from the battle-field of Shiloh as a means of defense against an immediate attack by our forces—and could not have possibly been expected to prove a serious impediment to us. At several commanding points the ground had been seemingly prepared for heavy artillery, but there were no positive indications of such ever having been placed in position. There were, however, embrasures for light pieces near the roads, and such seemed to have been put to use to cover the former. On the whole, the 'fortifications' afford the best possible evidence that Beauregard had no idea of running the risk of a battle before Corinth.

"The breastworks run over a succession of hills from a point near the Memphis and Charleston railroad east of Corinth to near the Purdy and Corinth road about a mile north of the town. Their entire length is said to be five miles."

WAS THE CAMPAIGN WELL CONDUCTED?

Want of caution like to have cost us the loss of an army at Pittsburg Landing—the exercise of too much caution lost us a great conquest at Corinth. If Pope had disobeyed orders and pushed his advantage of May 17th, he would have been in Corinth in sure earnest before the 20th, and have secured rebels enough to make a Sodom of any ten square miles of territory where they might quarter. After a careful survey of the events of that investment and its conduct we are inclined to indorse the view of a writer, then on the field, who said:

"I have been led to admire the manner in which General Halleck conducted the advance upon Corinth, and his precaution in fortifying at every resting-place. The wielding of the army has been admirable. But I can not commend his watchfulness in not knowing the rebels were retreating, when we were within half a mile of their lines for forty-eight hours. A reconnoissance in force, at several points, to the distance of

twenty rods beyond our pickets, would have discovered the whole facts. Of course, no other officer could order such a movement, and the responsibility must rest with the commanding General, provided there has really been a blunder, and I believe the country will characterize his lack of watchfulness as such."

That army should *not* have been allowed to escape, with all of its fine *materiel*, no more than the retreat from Yorktown should have been allowed. We had forces enough in both instances, if they had been handled with rapidity and directness, to have prevented both catastrophes—which we ever shall regard the evacuation, by the enemy, of Yorktown and Corinth to have been. Twenty thousand loyal men should have been left on the field rather than two hundred thousand rebels should have been allowed to escape to compel us to fight them somewhere else.

THE PURSUIT.

Beauregard's retreat was to the south and west, by railway. The expedition of Colonel Elliott—already referred to—had been so far successful as to result in a material check to the retreat. Halleck telegraphed to the War Department under date of June 1st, Pope's report of the expedition as follows:

"It gives me pleasure to report the brilliant success of the expedition sent out on the 28th inst., under Colonel Elliott. With the 2d Iowa cavalry, after forced marches, day and night, through a very difficult country, and obstructed by the enemy, he finally succeeded in reaching the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at Boonesville at two o'clock A. M. On the 30th he destroyed the track in many places, both south and north of the town, blew up one culvert, destroyed the switch and track burned up the dépôt and locomotives, and a train of twenty-six cars loaded with supplies of every kind, destroyed ten thousand stand of small-arms, three pieces of artillery, and a great quantity of clothing and ammunition, and paroled two thousand prisoners, which he could not keep with his cavalry. The enemy had heard of his movements, and had a train of box-cars and flat-cars, with flying artillery and five thousand infantry, running up and down the road to prevent him from reaching it. The whole road was lined with pickets for sev-

eral days. Colonel Elliott's command subsisted upon meat alone, such as they could find in the country. For daring and dispatch, this expedition has been distinguished in the highest degree, and entitles Colonel Elliott and his command to high distinction. Its results will be embarrassing to the enemy, and contribute greatly to their loss and demoralization. He reports the roads full of small parties of the retreating enemy, scattering in all directions.

“(Signed)

JOHN POPE, Major-General.

“H. W. HALLECK, Major-General Commanding.”

And further dispatches of Halleck to the Department, dated June 4th, indicated the results of the few days' doings of Pope's division :

“General Pope, with forty thousand men, is thirty miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard.

“He already reports ten thousand prisoners, and deserters from the army, and fifteen thousand stand of arms captured.

“Thousands of the enemy are throwing away their arms.

“A farmer says that when Beauregard learned that Colonel Elliott had cut the railway on the line of retreat, he became frantic, and told his men to save themselves the best way they could.

“We have captured nine locomotives and a number of cars. One of the former is already repaired and is running to-day. Several more will be in running order in two or three days. The result is all I can possibly desire.”

THE END.

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